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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE:

VALSARTAN NDMA PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION

) 19-MD-2875(RBK-JS)
) Camden, New Jersey
January 28, 2020
) 10:04 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF IN-PERSON STATUS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOEL SCHNEIDER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Collogue

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Colloguy (Court in Session) 1 THE COURT: THE COURT: Please be seated. Welcome 2 3 back to Camden. We're on the record in the Valsartan MDL, Docket No. 19-2875. 4 5 Why don't we start with the entries of appearance 6 for the leadership teams? 7 MR. NIGH: Good morning, Your Honor. Daniel Nigh 8 for the plaintiffs. 9 MR. SLATER: Good morning, Your Honor. Adam Slater 10 for plaintiffs. 11 MR. HONIK: Good morning, Your Honor. Ruben Honik for plaintiffs. 12 13 MS. WHITELEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Conlee Whiteley for plaintiffs. 14 15 MR. MATSTERIC: Good morning, Your Honor. George 16 Matsteric (phonetic) for plaintiffs. 17 MR. GOLDBERG: Seth Goldberg on behalf of the ZHP and the defendants. 18 19 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Brian 20 Rubenstein on behalf of the TEVA defendants and all defendants. 21 22 MR. TRISCHLER: Good morning, Your Honor. Clem Trischler for Mylan Pharmaceuticals and the defendants. 23 24 MR. JANOW: Good morning, Your Honor. Jon Janow on

behalf of Albertsons, and today on behalf of the objecting

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guy 5

defendants relating to the direct filing order.

MS. JOHNSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Sarah Johnson on behalf of the retailer and pharmacy defendants.

MS. RICHER: Good morning, Your Honor. Kristen Richer on behalf of retailer and pharmacy defendants.

THE COURT: We have a meaty agenda today. So let me just tell you how I think the day is going to proceed. Judge Kugler is updated on all the issues. And we're going to -- him and I are going to debrief after this conference.

We'll reconvene at 2:00. Judge Kugler would like to start by meeting just with the leadership teams in his jury room. And then we may or may not go on the record in the afternoon. A good deal of the issues that we have to discuss I think are appropriate for decision by Judge Kugler, as I mentioned.

But I would like to give him some background on the issues before we all meet this afternoon. We don't have a Court reporter here today. So if you're going to speak, please state your name so that the transcriber knows who's talking.

We can go down the agenda that the parties proposed, which is fine. I just have a couple of issues to get out of the way, and maybe we'll take one issue out of order. The first issue has to do with apparently maybe two of the parties were served pursuant to the Hague Convention, is that correct?

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Plaintiffs?

MS. WHITELEY: Your Honor, I believe one of the Mylan Indian entities we received confirmation that they were served. And then Hetero Drugs, the Indian entity was also served.

THE COURT: I don't know the time deadlines for service under the Hague. Do you know after service how long a defendant has to respond to the complaint?

MS. WHITELEY: Your Honor, at this moment in time

I'm not entirely sure. I do know that Hetero Drugs was served

at some point in September or November -- September, October

or November. But we only received confirmation last week.

And I think the triggering event may be when we received the

certificate. I'm not sure if that's the triggering event, or

if it's the actual service. But we can get that information.

THE COURT: What is the name of the company that -- the complete name of the company that was served?

MS. WHITELEY: I believe it's Hetero Drugs Limited.

THE COURT: And you received notice when?

MS. WHITELEY: Last week.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anyone here who represents Hetero?

MS. POLETTO: I represent Hetero USA, Your Honor.

Janet Poletto.

THE COURT: I know.

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MS. POLETTO: But I don't represent Hetero Drugs.

THE COURT: Do you have any information for the Hetero --

MS. POLETTO: The only information I have is that I understand they are working to get counsel in place, but that has not been put in place as of this conference.

THE COURT: Counsel, could you advise -- look at the rules, I don't know the rules -- I'm talking to plaintiff's counsel, advise the Court when Hetero Drugs Limited's response to the complaint is due? If they were served, they've known about this case for months.

They're served. We're going to hold their feet to the fire. If they don't answer in an appropriate amount of time -- or respond, enter an appearance, what they have to do -- what I think you have to do is, you know, under the Rules I suppose you can default them.

But unlike the usual case, this is not an instance where I want this party to linger out there. I want to make sure that they respond within the time frames that are required by the Rules. So if you could let the Court know when these parties have to respond pursuant to whatever the Hague service rules are, I'd be most appreciative.

And Hetero USA, I would get the message to Hetero Drugs Limited if you have communications with them that the Court has every intent of holding their feet to the fire on

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this. And they've known about this case for umpteen months. So let's get them in and do what we have to do to move this case along.

So one entity is Hetero Drugs Limited, who's the other entity that was served pursuant to the Hague?

MS. WHITELEY: The other entity that was served was the Mylan -- Mylan Labs Limited entity.

THE COURT: Is that -- what is the official name, is it labs or laboratories, do you know?

MS. WHITELEY: It's Mylan Laboratories, Limited.

THE COURT: Okay. And when did you receive notice that they were served?

MS. WHITELEY: I believe we received notice that they were served at the beginning of January.

THE COURT: Okay. So did you get notice a week or so ago?

MS. WHITELEY: That was -- a different firm served Mylan Laboratory Limited. We -- I believe that firm filed in the individual case. I think it was the Tack personal injury case. They filed a certificate when they received it to inform the Court and to put it on the main Docket.

I just resubmitted it last, I believe Friday when I filed the notice to the Court. But, you know, my understanding Mylan Laboratories Limited has been participating in discovery.

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So that was, you know --

THE COURT: Oh. Okay. Well, Mylan, let's get them in. And you'll let the Court know when they respond as well, correct?

MS. WHITELEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. TRISCHLER: Your Honor, I represent Mylan Laboratories Limited. And Mylan Lab -- Mylan has been participating in core discovery, and has complied with the core discovery orders of the Court.

THE COURT: Terrific.

MR. TRISCHLER: I'm not sure whether we've amended our appearance. We may have simply entered an appearance for Mylan Pharmaceuticals, one of the United States based entities. So we may have to amend our notice of appearance to reflect that we're appearing for Mylan Laboratories as well.

THE COURT: That would be great.

MR. TRISCHLER: But the discovery's been taken care of and is underway with respect to the Indian entity.

THE COURT: That's great. How about Hetero? I forgot about Hetero. Did they put the Hetero Drugs Limited, did they participate in core discovery?

MS. WHITELEY: No, Your Honor. Although Hetero USA did produce two drug master files that Hetero USA's ANDA applications referred to probably three weeks ago. But Hetero

Colloquy 10

Drugs and Hetero Labs -- the Indian Hetero entities have not participated in core discovery at all.

So we only have received, and Ms. Poletto can correct me if I'm wrong, we have only received that which was in the control of Hetero USA, you know, because of their ANDA applications.

MS. POLETTO: Janet Poletto, again, Your Honor, for Hetero USA. That's correct. We produced everything that Hetero USA had in its possession for core discovery, and then we had actually gotten the drug master files as requested by the plaintiffs, and those have been produced.

THE COURT: You can get the message to Hetero Drugs Limited that they may want to start pulling together the core discovery, because it won't be long --

MS. POLETTO: Your Honor, we --

THE COURT: -- before the Court orders them to produce it by a date certain. Unlike Mylan, they have every right to, you know, stand on formality, but so does the Court. And when they get in the case there, we're going to hold their feet to the fire.

MS. POLETTO: Through my channels, Your Honor, they're not direct ones. But through my channels, I have tried to convey that message.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. The second issue I'd just like to address is, we haven't heard much lately

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about whether there's any related state cases filed in New Jersey or around the country. And I'm just wondering if the parties could update the Court on that?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: I think it would have to more come from the defense. From our perspective, there really have not been many -- I'm not aware of any additional filings in New Jersey, other than the few that have occurred so far. And I'm not aware of any in other states that have been brought to our attention.

So I think the defense would have the best idea of that.

MR. GOLDBERG: Your Honor, I -- on behalf of ZHP, I'm aware that there are four cases -- four or five cases in New Jersey.

THE COURT: And those apparently are under control.

MR. GOLDBERG: They're under control. I know there are two cases, I believe in Illinois.

THE COURT: Are those under control as well?

MR. GOLDBERG: I don't -- I mean, I don't know, I

think they are for the time being. I think -- I think there

are some efforts to get them into the MDL in light of the

Irbesartan and Losartan expansion. But we can take an

inventory and report to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. I just didn't know if there was a swath of cases out there that we didn't know about. But I'm

Colloquy 12

gratified that there aren't.

MR. GOLDBERG: I don't believe there are.

THE COURT: Especially in New Jersey.

MR. GOLDBERG: But we can let the Court know.

THE COURT: Terrific. One of the issues I didn't see mentioned in the agenda, and hopefully it's because there's no issues involved in it. Pursuant to -- here's my notes. Let me just look at my notes.

One of the issues that was up for discussion today, if there was any dispute, I think was regard to the translations of the -- for the -- for ZHP purposes, is that hopefully no disputes?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: They're correct, Your Honor. We have a couple of terms that we're still working out, but we don't expect to need the Court's intervention.

THE COURT: Terrific. And just -- I'll tell you

what the Court -- the Court's notes reflect in terms of what's

due, what's coming up on the horizon. My notes indicate that

plaintiffs' responses to fact sheets were due on January 15th.

Did those come in, defendants? Am I right about that?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yeah, for the most

part, yes.

THE COURT: Great.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: We did get a bunch.

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But we did not get some at all for some plaintiffs that had fact sheets that were due. So we did want to address this at some point in the conference. Do I do --

THE COURT: Is that an order to show cause issue?
UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. It's not -- we're not dealing with the adequacy of the fact sheets, we're dealing with, I think I read plaintiffs who simply did not answer on time.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: That's right.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. We'll deal with that later.

And then the end of the month I think, and tell me if I'm right about this, the end of the month foreign regulatory documents are due, I take it? Akin to the inspection reports, warning letters, 483, et cetera?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Great. February plaintiffs' economic fact sheets due, medical monitoring. March plaintiffs' third-party payer fact sheets due. April 1, defendants to produce sales and pricing documents. End of May, that's the big production.

Defendants to produce responsive documents and ESI end of June, ZHP. That's what I have on my chronology.

Great. Okay. Why don't we go to the issues in the agenda.

First issue, expansion of the MDL and MDL management in light

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of the Losartan and Irbesartan expansion. This is an issue we can discuss. I think the final decision on this is going to be made this afternoon when we meet with Judge Kugler, but it would be helpful if I had a good understanding of what the parties are suggesting.

Quite frankly, I'm not clear from reading defendant's proposal, but that's why we're here. I think the consensus, as I understand the plaintiffs, is we're going to forge ahead on Valsartan, which we're going to do, we're not holding up Valsartan in any respect.

What is it you propose to do with the other two sartans?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: In the first instance, as we discussed with Your Honor on the telephone conference on the fifteenth, is to focus on the foundational issues, pleading-type issues, master complaints. And we first need to get our organization as a plaintiff group amended, and we've been in communication with attorneys that have said that they have an interest in joining either the PSC or committees, and I know some of them are here.

A few introduced themselves before the hearing. We're hoping to have a few minutes between conferences to speak to them. And then probably set up a conference call either later this week or early next week. Finalize our organization, and then at that point we can jump to master

Colloquy 15

complaints, because we'll have committees put in place. Get those in place, and then I think at that point, as we discussed with Your Honor, probably move to the foundational discovery, and to try to utilize the Valsartan work that we've done to the furthest extent possible.

You know, use that as a model. Not re-litigate issues that have already been litigated. To the extent that there may be a legitimate difference, we hope the meet and confer process will identify those differences, and then we can try to work with the defense to the extent, for example, some requests may or may not apply, or may need to be broadened or narrowed, whatever it is.

I would think that that's something that should be able to be discussed, and then, you know, at some point get those discovery requests in place. But, you know, in terms of timing, you know, we're talking probably several months to get our organization in place, get our committees up and running, get our master pleadings done, get those served, and then move on to the next phase.

THE COURT: Do you envision adding someone to the PSC who's going to be the point person for the Losartan and Irbesartan issues?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: There are a few firms that have expressed interest in becoming involved in that. I think one or two may not be members of the PSC now

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and we're certainly discussing that with them, and that's probably a reasonable thing to do if a firm is not part of our PSC structure and wants to join for that purpose absolutely. Plus there are a lot of firms that are already on our PSC and executive committee who will be involved as well.

So that there's -- there's already -- there's already skin in the game, as you might say. And then we'll form the committees, but the people who are focused on Irbesartan and Losartan, we would think those will be the type of people to have a more prominent positions on the committees, because they have focused interest on those drugs.

And there's obviously going to be work to be done to identify issues on them, so, yes.

on that part of the case. So we'll come back to plaintiffs. I think defendants have a different view, don't they? I understand plaintiffs how they want to proceed. They'll get their internal organization, get a direct filing order, amend the master complaint, and then work to clean up, in my words, the Valsartan discovery and adapt it for the other sartans. I don't think that's what the defendants propose.

MR. GOLDBERG: In some ways there's agreement at least with respect to proceeding with Valsartan. And I think -- I think the defendants understand that we've made a lot of progress with respect to working out some of the form

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documents, the document request and then fact sheets with respect to Valsartan.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDBERG: The -- and that -- that proceedings with respect to Valsartan should proceed.

Plaintiffs today have now indicated they're looking at a few months before Irbesartan and Losartan come on line, so to speak, and what that's going to look like. But our -- we are looking at this in terms of how you proceed with Valsartan.

So Valsartan can go ahead, but is there a way that Valsartan goes ahead that really is more efficient for the MDL? Because Valsartan is going to have, you know, decisions with respect to Valsartan, discovery with respect to Valsartan are going to have affect with respect to Irbesartan and Losartan.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOLDBERG: You could have -- as counsel conceded, there may be some streamlining with respect to the scope of discovery. But the material decisions about Valsartan, whether in fact the impurities in Valsartan rose to the level of a defect, it certainly had an affect on Irbesartan and Losartan parameters.

So one of the things we're thinking about is, how do you go ahead with Valsartan? Class certification is another

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issue. You know, this case, unlike Benicar, has a significant component that Benicar didn't, which is supply chain participants in the dozens.

Two extra drugs, three different kinds of claims. And as the Court is well-aware having been through it many times, class certification is no small task. But in this case, it's going to be a monstrosity, to say the least, because you're going to have to --

THE COURT: What is going to be a monstrosity?

MR. GOLDBERG: Class certification. The specific discovery --

THE COURT: Can I stop you there for one second?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah.

THE COURT: One of the issues we're going to discuss this afternoon with Judge Kugler, you're going to hear that if and when the case comes to trial, the economic case is going to go first. You're going to hear that, we've said that before.

One of the issues I discussed with Judge Kugler just today and that's going to be discussed this afternoon is, to try that case, do we need to decide class certification?

Should we decide class certification before we try that case?

MR. GOLDBERG: So that's a great question. And it's the comment that -- that that's one of concerns that's sort of motivating our looking at this now in light of the expansion

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of Irbesartan and Losartan is the -- are the comments the Court made in 2019 about proceeding ahead with the economic loss case.

The defect-related issues can be tried potentially through the personal injury cases. And you could have decisions on the merits as to whether there's a product defect. Whether the alleged impurities can cause the alleged injury. You can do all of that before you get to class certification.

And when you're talking about a case of this size, you're talking about three different drugs, you're talking about these different kinds of claims, as the Court noted, the personal injury cases have a different kind of public safety concern than the economic cases.

Tracking those issues first will create a lot of efficiency for the MDL.

THE COURT: So are you suggesting that PI cases start first?

MR. GOLDBERG: That's what -- that's what we're suggesting could have the most -- the most bang for the buck from an efficiency standpoint, so to speak, because you're going to address Irbesartan and Losartan issues. You're going to address issues that are pertinent to class certification.

Because you're going to -- you're going to, right now, here's a good example, right now the class is defined as

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four years worth of consumers who have paid for the drug, whether it's recalled or not recalled. We're going to get information about the scope of the recall from Valsartan, we're going to get information about timing, we're going to get information about thing, we're going to defendants are in and which defendants are out through that.

So there will be some decisions, some discovery that's going to help influence class certification. But one of the things that the Court will do by proceeding with the personal injury cases is save an awful lot of time and aggravation, so to speak, getting bogged down in discovery, going back and forth from wholesalers and retailers to the class representatives.

The third-party payers have a significant discovery obligation here. To get to the core of generic pricing for the class-wide damages model that they're going to have to do, that's a burden plaintiffs are going to have to satisfy, producing insurance policies, insurance plans, formularies pricing with respect to drugs, alternate pricing. We're going to have to delve into the 50-state class issues.

We're going to have the delve into real questions of ascertainability. That's even assuming that the economic loss claim survives. Because at some point it's going to have to be tested, right? And so --

THE COURT: On a motion.

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MR. GOLDBERG: On a motion. Right. And so, you know, putting aside some of these issues for another day, so that all of the economic discovery that would bear on pricing issues, that would bear on class certification, that really doesn't have to happen. It's completely divorced from the who, what, where, when and why of the defect. And if the defect proves to be something that rises to that level, then that's going to help plaintiffs in their Irbesartan and Losartan cases, and in their class certification case.

But if it doesn't, the parties have avoided three, you know, two more drugs worth of discovery. They're avoided the morass of class certification. So we think that that's an efficient way to approach it.

THE COURT: Isn't -- a hypothetical. Is it true that if we try the PI cases first, and let's say the defendants are successful on whatever reason, does that necessarily mean that the economic cases -- case goes away? Doesn't the economic case stand on its own and it's not necessarily dependent on the result of the PI case?

MR. GOLDBERG: If the Court -- if the Court rules -- if there's a ruling that the product wasn't defective in the PI case, then I'm not sure, but I'm --

THE COURT: Will that be the issue in the PI case?

Or would the issue in the PI case be whether there's general or specific causation?

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MR. GOLDBERG: Well I think there's both.

THE COURT: So those two issues will be at issue in the PI cases?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Let's say, hypothetically -hypothetically, defendants hit a home run, no general
causation. Does that mean the economic case goes away?

MR. GOLDBERG: You could have -- I think you could have a situation where the product is defective, but there's no general causation. And so, potentially, class action plaintiffs could say, look, we're not claiming physical injury, we're claiming the loss of value.

THE COURT: So -- so even if the defendants are successful on the PI cases -- if I'm wrong tell me, please -- it appears you acknowledge that the economic case is still going to be there.

MR. GOLDBERG: If there's a determination that there's a defect, then the economic loss case might still be there.

THE COURT: But that won't be decided in the PI case, will it?

MR. GOLDBERG: Sure. Sure.

THE COURT: So get back to my hypo, suppose you hit a home run, and either on a <u>Daubert</u>, or the jury says there's no general causation.

Colloguy MR. GOLDBERG: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes. Yes. A home 1 2 run --3 THE COURT: Does that mean there's no defect? 4 MR. GOLDBERG: A home run --5 THE COURT: Well, no. Does that necessarily mean there's no economic claims? 6 7 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes. And I believe so. 8 THE COURT: I have a feeling plaintiffs would 9 disagree with you. 10 MR. GOLDBERG: On -- well they can explain why. But if the product isn't defective --11 12 THE COURT: No, that's -- the defect --MR. GOLDBERG: -- that's the home run. 13 14 THE COURT: Well are you assuming that if there's no 15 general causation -- let's say there's -- there's a -- the 16 chemical is in the drug. But the jury, or Judge Kugler 17 determines that there's no general causation. But as a matter 18 of fact, the chemical is in the drug. You're saying that 19 doesn't make the product defective? 20 MR. GOLDBERG: If that doesn't rise to the level of a defect that creates liability for warranty claims or the 21 22 manufacturing defect claims that plaintiffs have alleged, then there would not be an econ -- that's the same -- the economic 23

THE COURT: I have a feeling -- maybe plaintiffs

loss claim is based on the same facts.

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would agree with you, but I don't necessarily think the plaintiffs will agree that even if they can't establish that there's no general causation, that that necessarily means they can't pursue the economic claim. Am I wrong plaintiffs?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: No, you're correct, Your Honor. No we're still on planet earth. We don't agree.

MR. GOLDBERG: General causation is whether the drug can cause the injury.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDBERG: The question of whether -- whether the impurity can cause the injury. The economic loss claim actually alleges something different, which is that plaintiffs simply didn't get value for their claim. That -- for what they paid for. That's their claim on the economic loss claim.

We bought a drug that was -- that was advertised as not -- or that was sold to us on the promise that it didn't contain an impurity, and it did, so we didn't get the benefit of our bargain. That's their claim.

THE COURT: So just so I'm clear, Mr. Goldberg, what Judge Kugler is going to hear this afternoon is plaintiffs' suggestion, proposal, what have you, that the PI claims be teed up for trial before the economic claims?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Defendants.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, defendants. Correct. Is that what you're proposing? Or suggesting?

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MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, I think if there's -- if there's a way to ensure that it creates efficiency, that's what we're suggesting.

THE COURT: And would it just -- and just on the Valsartan --

MR. GOLDBERG: Just on Valsartan.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And that's fine. You can, you know -- I just want to understand what your position is. Do plaintiffs have any thoughts on that, about how the cases should be ordered?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yeah, I mean, I think that what -- we've always had the understanding from very early in the litigation that Judge Kugler had a preference to move forward with the economic part of the case first. That's always been the premise.

THE COURT: That's right.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: We -- our experienced with Judge Kugler is when he makes his decision like that, you follow through with it, so we've always understood that was the way that we're going to proceed.

We disagree, without walking through it item-byitem, with what Mr. Goldberg just said about some efficiency
with trying a personal injury case first, it's not more
efficient. It doesn't help to give information to the
economic case that you would need for it, it would actually be

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inefficient.

And Your Honor suggested something that we're going to talk about this afternoon, which we have not heard before, but that sounds, no surprise, innovative, and it's something we're going to talk about during, you know, the interim, but it -- I can certainly, speaking for myself it sounds like a way to -- I mean, counsel just talked about the problems of class certification for ten minutes.

And it sounds like a solution that would put that to the back and actually try the merits of the claim for one or more plaintiffs on the economic level, and you'd get the answers to the information and probably be in a much better position to address class certification. I think that's what I'm hearing.

So I don't -- I don't see any strong feelings against that at our table. We'll talk about it, because we have to caucus. But it sounds like a very efficient way to approach a very complex litigation, so it makes sense. And it's not like it's the easy way out, there's still obviously a great deal that we're going to have to prove. We don't agree with the characterization of our claims, we don't agree with the idea that the defense has of how to proceed.

And I know Mr. Honik might want to address it as well.

MR. HONIK: Your Honor, there are two very good

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reasons that we've embraced for months now the idea first proposed by the Court to proceed with an economic class determination or trial first. Number one, your hypothetical is right on the money. Which is to say, if the defense were to hit a home run, and there were found to be no general causation, it does nothing to the economic claims.

Certainly the TPPs, insurance companies who paid for this drug, consumers who have paid for this drug are sounding a claim in warranty. And today's not the day to go into the depths of the legal argument, but the defect is really not the way we look at the case.

The case economically occurs -- the injury occurs at the point of sale. You simply can't sell an adulterated drug in America. And there are lots and lots of reasons that we'll present that will support and bolster that up and down the distribution chain. The harm is complete at that point. And -- and it doesn't really revolve around the tort concept of defect, as I think Mr. Goldberg is compressing.

So what does that mean? Under Rule 23, it doesn't happen often, but courts are absolutely permitted to determine a liability only class. And the way we envision this occurring in a highly efficient manner, is for us with in confer with the Court to pick, for example, a test state, or grouping of states that have, you know, clear warranty law on whatever claims we're going to proceed under on the economic

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basis, and then to try the issues that cover both the PI and 1 2 the economic cases. 3 What I mean by that is, was the drug contaminated? How did it get contaminated? How did it get into the stream 4 of commerce? When those issues -- if those issues are decided 5 6 first, they're universal to all the cases. So --7 THE COURT: I just want to understand --MR. HONIK: Sure. 8 9 THE COURT: -- and you'll make this -- this question 10 before Judge Kugler this afternoon. It sounds like you're meshing PI issues and economic issues together, and picking 11 the -- the -- am I right? Picking --12 MR. HONIK: Well I think there's overlap. 13 THE COURT: -- the important issues --14 15 MR. HONIK: There's factual overlap. The economic cases are interested in how this contamination occurred and 16 17 the extent of the contamination. 18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. HONIK: So is the PI. 20 THE COURT: No question about that. That's what we envision as to why we picked economic because there was so 21 much overlap. 22

MR. HONIK: As did we. And the longer we've sat with it, the more it makes sense. And we have to caucus internally, but I don't know that there needs to be, as Mr.

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Goldberg referred to it, a monstrous cert brief submitted to the Court, for the Court to have to unravel every aspect of it.

Rule 23 really can work very nimbly. You can -- you can require us to identify what state or groupings of states and what liability class we can present that will be the most efficient across the waterfront to try. And so we endorse completely the idea of having economic cases go first, so that we can present that, so that there's a significant overlap of factual issues that will be determined that will impact everything.

And for the reason the Court stated in its hypothetical, doing the PI cases first, I mean, they're going to focus undoubtedly on the causation issues, the scientific causation issues in terms of the drug's ability to create the cancers that are alleged here. That's not going to impact the economic case at all.

THE COURT: I was just going to say that. If we do try the economic case first, we may not get into general and specific causation, right?

MR. HONIK: I can't imagine why we would.

THE COURT: Well we would because the defendants are going to raise it.

MR. HONIK: Well --

THE COURT: Okay. I think over lunch you ought to

talk about that issue about whether or not -- what we're going to talk about, you can make your proposal to go forward with the PI cases, and then the issue that I can tell you was just raised today and you discussed it for the first time, whether we need, if we go froward with the economic case first, whether we necessarily need or should do class cert before we get to the trial on the merits.

That's an issue your groups ought to caucus on over lunch, because it's an issue we'll address this afternoon with Judge Kugler. Okay. I think I understand the plaintiffs' position, and I think I understand now the defendants' position. There's agreement we're going ahead on Valsartan, we're not slowing it up.

On the other sartan case, we may go forward on parallel tracks. Eventually they may catch up to Valsartan, but we're not going to hold up Valsartan until the other two sartans catch up.

So let's get to the direct filing order, and, again, this is an issue Judge Kugler's going to decide this afternoon, not me. But I have to tell you, both of us are a little confused by the paperwork we received, and I have all the attachments, and I read them. I don't really -- I don't really understand the submissions and what the differences are, why we can't just do a direct filing order without prejudice to anybody.

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So could you -- somebody, maybe it's you, can explain what all this is about?

MR. JANOW: Of course Your Honor. And, again, it's Jon Janow on behalf of Albertsons, and speaking on behalf of the defendants, and specifically the objecting defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. Now Albertsons, are they -- what category are they in?

MR. JANOW: Albertsons is a grocery chain that has a pharmacy resale component.

THE COURT: So they would be, what, a retailer?

MR. JANOW: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So I think the letter identified who the "objectors" are, right?

MR. JANOW: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So let's just get some background, before we hear your argument. Albertsons was named in how many cases?

MR. JANOW: Albertsons is named in the monitoring class action complaint. It is named in a very limited number of directly filed complaints.

THE COURT: Valsartan?

MR. JANOW: Only Valsartan, Your Honor. We -- it's -- to my knowledge, we have not been named in any of the Irbesartan or Losartan cases.

THE COURT: Okay. So were you in the case when the

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original direct filing order was entered?

MR. JANOW: No, Your Honor. The original direct filing order was entered in early April of 2019. Albertsons was not served with the complaint in this case until, I believe, late September, and we did not enter our appearance in the case until sometime in the middle of October. And I could find the dates for you, but that's generally the time line.

THE COURT: Okay. So the cases that Albertsons is involved in, they weren't transferred here from the Panel, they were direct filed here?

MR. JANOW: Correct, Your Honor. With one exception. There was -- I believe there was an initial -- there was one case that did name Albertsons that was transferred by the MDL Panel to this Court. Albertsons was never served with that complaint, to my knowledge. But in any event, that case has been dismissed by the parties.

So it is no longer pending before this Court.

THE COURT: Is Albertsons taking the position there's no jurisdiction over it in New Jersey?

MR. JANOW: Correct. Our position, Your Honor, is

-- Albertsons' position with respect Albertsons specifically
is that this Court has no personal jurisdiction over it in any
case whatsoever.

THE COURT: So let me ask you a question. Suppose

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the Court agrees with you, no jurisdiction over Albertsons. Where would -- where is Albertsons a citizen of, what states? Where is it incorporated, where is it's nerve center? MR. JANOW: Albertsons is headquartered in Idaho. THE COURT: Okay. So what -- is it Albertsons' position that plaintiff would have to file this case against Albertsons in Idaho? MR. JANOW: I'm not sure that would be our definitive position. Our position would be that plaintiffs have to file cases in jurisdictions where there's personal jurisdiction both as to the plaintiff and the specific claims the plaintiff is asserting as to Albertsons specifically as a defendant. THE COURT: Okay. Let's just take a hypothetical. Let's say there's a plaintiff who bought Valsartan from Albertsons in Idaho. MR. JANOW: Um-hum. THE COURT: Would that plaintiff then need to sue Albertsons in Idaho state court if it wanted to pursue Albertsons? So I don't know that it would -- that MR. JANOW: that would be the only venue that it could sue Albertsons.

But certainly if a specific resident of Idaho purchased a drug

and could allege that they purchased it from Albertsons in

Idaho, that would likely be a -- a likely basis of

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jurisdiction in Idaho.

I mean, they could --

THE COURT: Is there a --

MR. JANOW: I'm sorry, Your Honor. And they could choose to file it, probably in state court, and then I think, depending on the circumstances of the complaint, there would be a determination as to whether Federal Court jurisdiction would be appropriate in Idaho.

THE COURT: Is there a state that Albertsons does business in other than Idaho?

MR. JANOW: Yes, Your Honor. It's --

THE COURT: It doesn't matter where it is.

MR. JANOW: -- it does -- it does business in many states. Yes.

THE COURT: Pick one. It doesn't matter.

MR. JANOW: Louisiana.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's say a Federal -- so the Court agrees with your argument, the case is dismissed from New Jersey. The case is filed in Federal Court in Louisiana. There's jurisdiction over Albertsons in Louisiana. What happens to that case? Doesn't it go back to the Panel and doesn't the Panel send it here?

So why are we going in this circle?

MR. JANOW: Your Honor, I believe it -- that factual circumstance could raise a possibility you suggest, which is

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that --

THE COURT: So why are we going through these objections, if the case is going to wind up back here?

MR. JANOW: And there's two points, Your Honor. One is that that's very much a hypothetical, at this point. There are very, very limited cases filed against Albertsons currently.

And so we don't have --

THE COURT: So what? Take my hypothetical.

Louisiana Federal case filed against Albertsons, okay? One defendant, Valsartan, sued in Louisiana. Okay? I'm sorry, one plaint -- no, they would sue everyone who's sitting here.

Wouldn't -- isn't it likely one of those -- isn't it likely that judge is going to send the case to the Panel? And isn't the Panel going to send the case here? So I guess the question is, why are we going in that circle?

MR. JANOW: I understand, Your Honor. I'm not sure that I think that automatically that would be the case. If the -- if a specific plaintiff names a whole host of defendants in a particular court, let's say it's a state court in Louisiana. There would be a number of --

THE COURT: State court would be different.

MR. JANOW: Yeah. State court would be different, or Federal Court, Your Honor. There would be a number of steps that could -- that would be in the way and that could be

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potentially be in the way that might limit the pathway that Your Honor is describing, which is to go through the MDL Panel.

THE COURT: I understand state court cases, this hypothetical, it's not removable. So it stays in state court. Can't do anything about it. Federal Court, what's -- what's a barrier to the case going in the circle to the Panel back here?

MR. JANOW: Right. Your Honor, again, we're dealing with a hypothetical, so I'm trying to work with that, without having all the facts. But I would suggest that there may be personal jurisdiction issues, venue issues, or other issues relating to any or all of the various defendants, and there's very many of them.

They're located in different states, they have different factual patterns.

THE COURT: But if it goes to the Panel and the Panel sends it here, you're back -- I don't understand. I guess I'm -- you're going to hear this this afternoon too.

MR. JANOW: I understand. And I'm prepared to discuss it with Judge Kugler as well. But my suggestion to the Court is that, I understand that that may be a possibility. But that I don't believe that it's an automatic eventuality.

And that -- and that there are multiple steps to the

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process, including parties, if they choose to, for example, if there's only one case against my client in the whole country, it may not be in my client's interest to -- to support transfer. And we may be able to argue that it should not be transferred in that --

THE COURT: Do you think if there's only one case against your client, or two or three cases against your client that this Court is not going to do something to make sure that you're not caught up in this morass?

MR. JANOW: Your Honor --

THE COURT: That's what we're trying to do. In fact, did you read the order -- I forgot what it's called, but one of the orders that we commended the parties for working on was the stipulated ordering dismissal of parties and tolling agreement, Docket Number 248, to let then tangential parties have some breathing room.

Doesn't that give you some comfort, the objecting parties, that if they're so tangential to the case and have such a minimal contact, doesn't that order give them some comfort?

MR. JANOW: Well, Your Honor, respectfully no. And I'll explain. For my client, Albertsons, we -- again, we believe that there are no cases pending against Albertsons to which there is any jurisdiction in any court.

And so we, you know, I understand that the Court

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wants to keep parties that are rightfully in the case in the case. But to the extent there's no personal jurisdiction over my client in any case, we would respectfully submit that we shouldn't be here.

THE COURT: I know. But let me ask you this question. Just dealing with practicalities, and economics, and I'm sure Albertsons is like every other client, they don't want to spend unnecessary transaction costs. And it's perfectly understandable why they wouldn't want to be caught up in this morass, if they have such a minimal contact with Valsartan in sales.

But no matter how you cut the mustard, one way or the other they're going to be subject to discovery, whether it's here, or in Idaho, or Louisiana, because plaintiff needs discovery from Albertsons to prove its case.

Wouldn't it make more sense, isn't it more economical, isn't it more efficient to work with this Court to protect your client's interests, produce the minimal discovery, get out pursuant to this order, everything is without prejudice to anybody.

MR. JANOW: But, respectfully, Your Honor, I understand that. And we believe that -- that if there was some pathway other than that. For example, I mean, if the plaintiffs wanted to stipulate to dismissal to my client, certainly we would accept that.

If there's -- you know, and we have no desire to avoid appropriate discovery obligations where there's a basis for jurisdiction for those obligations.

THE COURT: Maybe over the break you may want to look at that order, number 248.

MR. JANOW: Okay.

THE COURT: We are very, very sensitive to issues that minimal contact parties, or parties who have minimal contact with the case in terms of sales, what have you, don't get bogged down in this litigation.

We're very, very sensitive to that. That's why we have that order. You may want to look at that over the break and see if that gives you some comfort, on top of all the representations that plaintiff have given you, the Court will give you any representation you want that anything you do is without prejudice. You're not waiving a jurisdictional defense.

Anyway, I said my piece. Let's get to -- let's to the trying to understand what you're proposing with the direct filing.

MR. JANOW: Thank you, Your Honor. And if I may just respond to one brief point. You know, we have looked closely at that -- that order that you referenced. You know, we -- our -- our position is that, you know, if there's no jurisdiction whatsoever, or a client that it should not just

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be sort of a dismissal with prejudice, and an agreement to participate in discovery.

But that we should be dismissed from the case and, you know, be able to tell the various components of the company that -- that they're, you know, that there's no litigation pending anymore, and management, et cetera.

THE COURT: I would just ask you, if you would indulge the Court, to think about the efficiencies and economics. And what is more efficient, to do it our way, or, you know, to -- to get you out of the case and eventually probably be back here, or if not be back here be before a judge in a different state who has no knowledge whatsoever about the case?

That's all I would ask you to consider.

MR. JANOW: I understand, Your Honor. And -- and if I might raise two -- two related points. The first is, I know I've been speaking a lot about Albertsons here today. I just wanted to be able to reference the other types of defendants that are objecting in the same way that Albertsons is.

And there's a large number of them. There are retailers and wholesalers as well.

THE COURT: No problem.

MR. JANOW: Understood, Your Honor. Just a few points of -- of sort of development. First, for the various retailers, my understanding is that for the vast majority of

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retailers, each of them only has a very small number of cases pending before the Court.

And so they may be similarly situated to Albertsons. And then there are also wholesalers that have and surely those who may fall into different categories that may have their own unique issues as relates to this. And so it may be more complicated than Albertsons, although I'm obviously here and can speak to my client.

THE COURT: Could you just explain to the Court -okay, you object to the direct filing order that we have for
Valsartan. And then there's all these different proposals. I
got to tell you, I'm confused. Could you maybe explain what
your proposing?

MR. JANOW: Yes, Your Honor. I would be happy to and we -- we proposed those -- we provided those to the Court mindful of the Court's directive that we should come prepared to discuss today, and we wanted to provide the Court a potential mechanism forward, given the objecting defendants' objections.

So let me go through the two proposals for you. Well I should clarify. There's one proposal and that's the first one that was I hope --

THE COURT: Exhibit?

MR. JANOW: Exhibit B, I believe, Your Honor. And then there's a redline attached at Exhibit C, and that redline

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is --

THE COURT: Okay. So let's deal with C. Let's deal with the redline version, C.

MR. JANOW: Sure.

THE COURT: What is C?

MR. JANOW: So C, Your Honor, is a proposed superceding direct file order. And it would replace and supercede CMO 3.

THE COURT: And how is this different than what we have now?

MR. JANOW: It -- what it does is it would -- it provides -- a brief procedural background at the beginning.

And we did that both for the Court's convenience and because, frankly, there are -- there are likely to be future defendants who are not before this Court now that may be brought in in Losartan and Irbesartan that we thought might benefit from an explanation of the complex procedural history here, Your Honor.

Certainly it took a lot of work to understand it ourselves. And then it essentially just, if you flip to, you know, sections two and --

THE COURT: Yeah, but this order -- this order doesn't just apply to Losartan and Irbesartan, right? You're suggesting it encompasses all three drugs, right?

MR. JANOW: Correct, Your Honor. And the intention

there is to account for the numerous defendants like my client that join this litigation far, far later than the order was entered.

And so if you look at section two and section three, there are essentially very few changes from the existing CMO 3, except that it provides the types of sort of additional preservation of rights language that the plaintiffs and I discussed yesterday.

And just in order to sort of beyond a shadow of a doubt, you know, that all of the various defendants have so preserved their rights and all of their arguments and affirmative defenses in the case. And I don't believe that that type of language is -- is disputed by the parties, or objected to by the plaintiffs, although they can certainly let the Court know.

THE COURT: Well what's the difference?

MR. JANOW: The difference, Your Honor, is in section four, if you flip to section four. This order --

THE COURT: Let me just get to it.

MR. JANOW: Of course, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Section four on page seven.

MR. JANOW: And --

THE COURT: Oh, wait. Okay. Section four, on page

seven.

MR. JANOW: Yes, Your Honor. As you'll see the --

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this section is intended to address the objecting defendants' objections. And essentially what it does is, what the order does is it authorizes direct filing as to the parties that stipulate to the filing.

THE COURT: So basically you're saying no direct filing against the objecting defendants.

MR. JANOW: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That's the meat of it.

MR. JANOW: That's the meat of the proposal, Your

Honor. We object.

THE COURT: Okay. And then there's, what's Exhibit 11

D and E? 12

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MR. JANOW: So mindful of the plaintiffs express 13 14

desire and the Court's --

THE COURT: Hold on let me just --

MR. JANOW: Sure.

THE COURT: -- I think I know the answer, but plaintiffs -- do plaintiffs object to Exhibit C?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: There's some -there's some things we need to talk about language-wise.

THE COURT: Section four, that's the key. Do plaintiffs object to that?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: If this is being read to me that the order doesn't apply to all the defendants, yes, we object to it.

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Colloguy THE COURT: Okay. I assumed that, I just wanted to get that on the record. UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yeah. And there's one thing -- I'm not sure, I might have heard something, Albertsons was named as we've just confirmed in the personal injury and medical monitoring master complaints back when the original direct filing order was entered. I think -- you can correct me if I'm wrong, so I'm not sure -- counsel seemed to say that they weren't in the case when that was entered. But they were. So I'm not -- and most of the defendants, if not all of them, CVS and a few others, were already in the case that are now objecting when they're already subject to the original order. I mean, there's a lot of confusion here, but, I mean, we -- our position you understand. THE COURT: Okay. We'll deal with that. MR. JANOW: Your Honor, just to --THE COURT: Don't worry about that. Let's just move on. What's Exhibit D and E? MR. JANOW: So, again, mindful of plaintiffs'

position as we discussed, plaintiffs' counsel and I discussed yesterday in our meet and confer telephone conference. And mindful of the Court's desire to continue to move the Valsartan case and the other cases forward as best it can, we wanted to provide the Court with something else to consider.

Although, to be clear, we are not proposing -- the objecting defendants are not proposing this, for the very key and important reason that we don't believe that the Court has authority to enter this order under 28 U.S.C. 1407, or any other section.

THE COURT: So what happens, hypothetically, if the Court does enter the order? Over your objection, which is clear.

MR. JANOW: Understood.

THE COURT: What happens?

MR. JANOW: Well I would suggest, Your Honor, and as we articulated in the submission, that the appropriate course and the necessary course is then to allow the objecting defendants and all the defendants, frankly, to move to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds --

THE COURT: Suppose the Court says no. Then what?

MR. JANOW: Well, Your Honor, if -- if the Court

enters the -- again enters an order over our objections and

declines to permit us at this point to move to dismiss on

personal jurisdiction grounds, you know, we would obviously

have to discuss with clients and evaluate whatever next step

options we would do.

I say that mindful that we of course will have no desire, as we expressed in the submission, to disrupt the proceedings in this Court and --

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THE COURT: What are the options though? Are there any options if the Court says no?

MR. JANOW: Well, Your Honor, at some point the -- the personal jurisdiction issues must be decided by the Court.

THE COURT: Correct. No -- I don't think anyone's going to disagree with that, and it's just a question of when.

MR. JANOW: And they certainly I would suggest, Your Honor, they certainly can't be tabled forever past motions to dismiss for -- on substantive grounds on 12(b)(6) grounds. They certainly can't go beyond summary judgment. Certainly can't go beyond class certification.

And, indeed, we cited to Your Honor in the submission cases both from the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court that direct that courts must take up personal jurisdiction issues at the very beginning of a case. And, in fact, it was -- it is far superior to address those personal jurisdiction issues before 12(b)(6) issues where possible. And the Supreme Court has -- has stated in no uncertain terms in the cases we cite in our submission that -- that where the Court has -- is without jurisdiction over the -- over the defendants without personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the only role that the Court has is to determine that it is without jurisdiction and dismiss the case.

And so we would submit, Your Honor, that it would be error to defer the decision-making process on personal

jurisdiction at this time, particularly because there are numerous defendants that believe there are serious deficiencies, very serious deficiencies in the plaintiffs' cases against them on jurisdictional grounds, on personal jurisdiction grounds, venue grounds, and that we should be afforded the opportunity to present those arguments promptly so that the cases that -- sorry, the defendants that are improperly before this Court can be dismissed.

And that the rest of the case can be so streamlined. I mean, we suggest as the Court is considering case management issues, that a very fundamental issue of case management is to dismiss the parties to which the Court does not have jurisdiction, to streamline the number of parties in the case to those that should be involved, and those that should not be involved, and that fundamentally helps manage a large case like this.

And I should add that one of the issues in this case developing its complexity is plaintiffs' own decision-making and elections as to who they are suing, and how many, and the different types of defendants they're suing. These are plaintiffs' elections.

And they have elected to sue upwards of, I believe I read in a submission, upwards of 50 defendants? Maybe it's fewer than that, but in the dozens. Various different types, spread out all across the country, and across an entire --

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well, you know, the majority -- a very large part of an industry.

And so once you've taken on that level of decision-making and pleading, the complexity necessarily increases. And that complexity was brought on by the plaintiffs and the cases they've elected to file.

And so, respectfully, Your Honor -- respectfully, we would submit that the only option -- the option for the Court would be to -- if they Court wished to enter the order in the form of Exhibit -- of Exhibit D, that it may do that, but it should only do that if -- if it's promptly providing all of the defendants an opportunity to move on the jurisdictional grounds.

And, again, just for the sake of the record, we don't propose -- we would object to the entry of Exhibit D, because we do not believe the Court has the authority under 18 U.S.C. 1407 to enter that type of order over our objections.

THE COURT: Do plaintiffs, apart from the issue of

-- apart from the condition subsequent that this order be

conditioned on giving them the right to immediately file their

motions, put that aside. Is there any language -- any

objection of the plaintiffs to this Exhibit D order, because

it -- I just took a quick look at it, it appears all it does

is just preserve the objecting parties objections.

MR. SLATER: Yeah. When we're saying the Exhibit D

order, that's the redline you sent me with the --

THE COURT: That's the redline version.

MR. SLATER: -- with the language that you're objecting, but there's stipulating defendants and non-stipulating defendants? That's --

MR. JANOW: Correct. And just to explain. So D is

MR. SLATER: I'm just making sure I have the right

MR. JANOW: Exhibit D is the order, Exhibit E is the redline. That redline's the order against CMO number three. And this is the order that we discussed yesterday that is the alternate order that over our -- over the objecting defendants' objections would, if the Court so chose, and determined it had the authority to do so, would enter the direct filing over our objections, but expressly preserve all of our rights in every shape -- way, shape and form.

MR. SLATER: The parts that matter, we have no issue with. There's some language that I could talk to counsel with, there's a few words here and there that would need to be fixed. We don't think the preamble is needed, and it -- you know, the history of the world part one we didn't think was necessary in the preamble, because it sort of characterizes the litigation, and who knows how that plays out. I mean, but the concept of it is we just want a direct file order. And

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when counsel yesterday said we don't want a shadow of a doubt,

I said please put into the order there won't be a shadow of a

doubt that you're preserving your objections. I mean, so --

THE COURT: There is no doubt about that.

MR. SLATER: No, of course not.

THE COURT: From the Court's perspective, from plaintiffs' perspective, there's no doubt about that. Nothing

MR. SLATER: It's an administrative vehicle. I mean
-- I mean, what really is happening here is the defense sees
this as a way to essentially challenge the authority of the
JPML to send whole cases to an MDL judge. I mean, that is
what's happening here today, and they're over-reading
Bristol-Myers case, which explicitly addressed Justice
Sotomayo's dissent where she said, how are we going to run
class actions? How are we going to run these large
litigations? What are you going to do, sever parts of the
case and try them over the country? And the majority opinion
actually said, don't worry, that's a due process issue under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Bristol-Myers, because it was state
court.

This would be a Fifth Amendment issue, which would be analyzed differently. So, I mean, that's what's going on here, I think. Counsel can tell me if I'm wrong, maybe I'm not sure what I'm talking about. But there -- and they get

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nowhere with this. I mean, so what they're saying is
Albertsons, which isn't like Joe Albertsons Pharmacy on Main
Street in Idaho, it's a massive store, it's a massive chain
that belongs in the litigation, because it sold a lot of
Losartan to a lot of people, is saying, you can't run the case
against us in New Jersey, even though the JPML sent it here,
you have to do it in a Federal Court somewhere else, so you
have to sever us out of this case, because obviously the case
proceeds, and then the MDL judge will have to coordinate with
the District Judge there, and that's how it's going to have to
be done.

I find it very hard to imagine that the Third Circuit or Supreme Court would say, yeah, that's a good idea. Or, yes, that's what <u>Bristol-Myers</u> means. But that's the argument they want to make. And we obviously think with some tweaking the order would be fine.

If all this paranoid language needs to be in there, it's fine. We just want to be able to administratively get cases here without having to burden clerks and the JPML transferring cases.

MR. JANOW: Your Honor, if I may just briefly respond to the -- one of the points that Mr. Slater was articulating. The <u>Bristol-Myers</u> case is a very important case in terms of the evolution of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the country. And subsequent to <u>Bristol-Myers</u>

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<u>Squibb</u>, multiple courts across the country, including the multiple judges in this District, have applied <u>Bristol Myers</u>
<u>Squibb</u> to class actions in Federal Court.

And I can point the Court to the <u>Horowitz</u> case, it's <u>Horowitz v. AT&T</u>, that's at 28 U.S. District Lexis 69191. It says Judge Martinotti from April 2018. Where the Court looked at this precise issue and applied <u>Bristol-Myers</u> and the directives from <u>Bristol-Myers</u> to cases -- class actions in Federal Court. Same with Judge Wolfson before she became Chief Judge.

This is <u>Chernus v. Loqitech</u>, this is an April of 2018 case as well. The case cite is 2018 U.S. District Lexis 70784. And the pin site is star 13 through 18. And we cite -- I believe we cited those cases in our submission to the Court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think I understand the objecting parties' position. I can talk intelligently about it. You'll address these to Judge Kugler this afternoon. Here's what I would ask. Over the break, if you could meet and confer with your objecting parties. Is it better to do what you're suggesting, send these cases all over the country, the likelihood is pretty good you're going to wind up back here. But even if not, you're going to be in front of some judge who has no background in the case.

Would you rather that, or would you rather be here

before a Court who's extremely sensitive to issues of parties who only have a minimal role in the case? We've already put in place an order to get you out of the case. We're trying to phase discovery so you're not overburdened. I would just ask you to consider what is genuinely in the best interests of your client.

With the proviso in neon -- in a neon sign that says, without prejudice. Yes, you'll be in New Jersey. It's not a bad place. But some day you're going to be able to raise your objections. If I was in your client's shoes, I would rather be here than in some jurisdiction that is not going to be sensitive to your client's concerns. Who's not going to look out to protect your client's concerns.

But that's your choice. That's your client's choice. So like I said, I understand the issue, you make your argument this afternoon and we'll see what Judge Kugler rules. Okay?

Yes, sir?

MR. GEOPPINGER: Your Honor, may I be heard on one point, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Just identify your name and who you represent.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Jeff Geoppinger from AmerisourceBergan. One point --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Jeff Geoppinger from AmerisourceBergan, Your Honor.

THE COURT: AmerisourceBergan. Okay.

MR. GEOPPINGER: To your point about not involving peripheral defendants in the morass of the litigation, Your Honor. And I appreciate the sensitivity of the Court to that issue, because I consider my client a peripheral defendant in this case.

THE COURT: I have a feeling plaintiffs may not agree.

MR. GEOPPINGER: They may not agree, Your Honor. But to my point, Your Honor --

THE COURT: There's probably not a defendant out there who doesn't think they're a peripheral defendant.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Correct, Your Honor. But whether I am, or my client is, or my client is not, I would just offer the Court, Your Honor, that a direct filing order is going to do the exact opposite of keeping peripheral defendants out of this litigation.

A direct filing order is going to allow plaintiffs to come into this courtroom, as many have already done, to peripheral defendants who are not subject to the direct filing order that's in this case, and checked every box on a complaint.

THE COURT: There's Rule 11 concerns, though, isn't

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there?

MR. GEOPPINGER: There should be.

THE COURT: Not should be, there is.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Yes. There certainly should be.

THE COURT: There is.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Well those things certainly shouldn't happen, Your Honor, but I think, and the Court is very experienced with MDL's and many of the attorneys here are as well, but that kind of thing does happen. And there are lots that check all the boxes.

And a direct filing order, unfortunately, can promote that kind of activity when it shouldn't have.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Next issue on the agenda is the Legacy motion. Is that really combined with the direct filing order that we've been talking about? Is Legacy's counsel here?

MR. ST. ONGE: Yes, Judge. Britton St. Onge on behalf --

THE COURT: Is that the same issue basically?

MR. ST. ONGE: Largely, but we think that Legacy is such a tiny player in this, there's only two cases -- involving Losartan involves Legacy that have been filed in Federal Court. And we think that our motion to dismiss ought to be taken up, because they're such a small issue. And because the connections of the two cases they're actually --

absolutely has no connection between New Jersey and plaintiffs' claims in those cases.

THE COURT: So where is Legacy based?

MR. ST. ONGE: In Missouri, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So you want the plaintiffs to file a case against you in Missouri?

MR. ST. ONGE: I'd prefer they not file it, but if they file a case it should -- it would be general jurisdiction there.

THE COURT: Suppose they file it in Federal Court in Missouri, hypothetically, okay. And then it goes to the Panel, and then aren't you back here?

MR. ST. ONGE: It's possible. But that Court would have jurisdiction. As it exists a direct file in the case wouldn't have personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: What am I missing? You're going to wind up back here anyway, what am I missing? Why are we going through this?

MR. ST. ONGE: Because it goes to the very power of the Federal Court to hear a case before it. And so it needs to be filed in the jurisdiction where the court has the power to adjudicate, even things short of the merits.

(Transcriber change)

THE COURT: So Legacy -- hear me out -- I want to understand Legacy's argument. Legacy is not happy that

there's a direct filing against it and it's wound -- winds up in New Jersey preserving all of its defenses, but if the case is re-filed in Missouri, it goes to the panel and it winds up back here -- Legacy doesn't have a problem with that?

MR. ST. ONGE: At that point, Legacy would not have an objection to personal jurisdiction, but we think it would have an argument for why it shouldn't be transferred down -- transferred back to the MDL Court, and so we -- they would oppose -- oppose any transfer and if it ended up back here, then that's how the chips would fall that way.

But at least it would not be subject to jurisdiction in a Court like this without having gone through the case being filed in the Court where it does have jurisdiction, and it goes to the very power of the Court to -- to adjudicate the merits and adjudicate matters and shorten (phonetic) the merits, including discovery, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Got it. Thank you, counsel.

MR. ST. ONGE: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay, well now let's go to a simple issue like downstream discovery. Non-manufacturing defendants, I guess have we reached a consensus that we need a representative to talk to for the wholesalers/distributors, and then the retailers/dispensers, and if so, I hope -- do we have those persons? And let's get them on the defendant -- whatever we call them -- executive committee, what have you.

Ms. Johnston, what do you think?

MS. JOHNSTON: Well, Your Honor, you signed the order that -- that appointed me to the Defense Executive Committee on behalf of the retailers and pharmacies. I can't speak to whether there should be a representative for the wholesalers. Obviously they, you know, in a -- in a perfect world, it's a -- it's a very nice thing to have.

But it is a lot of work for one person to do on behalf of entities and, you know, speaking solely for the -the retailers and pharmacies, while we're similarly situated, we're not identical and so there's a lot that can be done in terms of coordination, but I -- I will never have the ability to speak for every of the dozen or so pharmacies who were named.

THE COURT: You would be a liaison.

MS. JOHNSTON: Correct.

THE COURT: I don't think the Court to expects you to bind somebody else's client.

MS. JOHNSTON: I understand.

THE COURT: Let me hold that thought. Wholesalers-distributors.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Good morning again, Your Honor,

Jeffrey Geoppinger --

THE COURT: I think we have an appointee to the executive committee.

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MR. GEOPPINGER: Well -- well, Your Honor, so there's -- there's three of us. There's AmerisourceBergen, there's Cardinal and there's McKesson, Your Honor, and candidly, Your Honor, there's only three of us and we've been working together, we've been working well and I think we've been working well with the plaintiffs.

I don't think we've had any issues really. But one of the issues, Your Honor, is given our belief, given that there's only three of us, given our status as peripheral defendants whether our adversaries agree or not --

THE COURT: It's a -- let me get the three -
Amerisource --

MR. GEOPPINGER: Cardinal, McKesson.

THE COURT: Got you.

MR. GEOPPINGER: And in our -- our status, what we believe to be in the litigation, candidly, Your Honor, the cost of the effort that would be required to put one of us on the executive committee and the burden that would fall on the individual defendant in that case is not something either one of the three of our clients are necessarily interested in or have allowed us to sign up for at this point, and therefore we've been working as a threesome and we've been doing a -- and we've been doing a good job and I think, Your Honor, that the --

THE COURT: Yeah, but that --

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MR. GEOPPINGER: -- the communication with the 1 2 plaintiffs --3 THE COURT: -- it makes it -- doesn't it make it so 4 much more difficult and cumbersome for the plaintiffs and more 5 importantly the Court to deal with three separate people --6 MR. GEOPPINGER: Your Honor, as to dealing with the 7 plaintiffs, again, I think candidly when we have (inaudible) 8 versus plaintiffs, a code word for the plaintiffs, my phone 9 call interrupted that. There's three lawyers, three parties, 10 each one of us is represented. If the plaintiffs need a point person, I'm happy to volunteer for that. They can call me 11 whenever they want, they can email me whenever they want --12 13 THE COURT: So can I get the correct spelling of 14 your name? 15 MR. GEOPPINGER: Certainly. It's -- it's G-E-O-P-P-16 I-N-G-E-R, and I'm -- I'm happy, I've talked with my co-17 counsel, I'm happy --18 THE COURT: With what firm, sir? MR. GEOPPINGER: Ulmer & Berne. 19 20 THE COURT: How do you spell that? 21 MR. GEOPPINGER: Ulmer, U-L-M-E-R and Berne, B-E-R-N-E. 22 THE COURT: And where is that based? 23 24 MR. GEOPPINGER: Cincinnati, Ohio. 25 THE COURT: Would it give you some comfort if the

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Court's order provides that the members of your group, Ms.

Johnston, have to agree on some sort of cost sharing

arrangement? Would that give you some comfort?

MR. GEOPPINGER: Would that give my client some comfort, Your Honor? Yeah, that -- that -- certainly I have to talk about it with my other -- with other counsel, but I think that -- that could be an issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Johnston, would that give you some comfort?

MS. JOHNSTON: Well, Your Honor, I think that the -you know, anytime that sort of offer is made, then yes, it
would -- it would be -- it would be great. I think that the
-- the real issue is that at the end of the day, there's not a
true way to avoid there being multiple people on a phone call
when you've got different entities that have different
interests, and so I think that you can get to 75, 80 percent
of what would be collectively good for the group, but I think
there are always going to be some -- some smaller nuances that
-- that require people to listen in and participate in meet
and confers on things like discovery.

THE COURT: Maybe one of the reasons that things get bogged down so much is because there's so many people at meetings and phone calls.

MR. GEOPPINGER: Your Honor, I would -- I would -- from the wholesalers' standpoint, I don't think things have

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been -- been bogged down at all.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay.

MR. GEOPPINGER: The three of us have been

very --

THE COURT: I got it.

MR. GEOPPINGER: -- available and able to do the job.

THE COURT: I think we going to appoint liaison, counsel. It just would make the case go so much more efficiently and to protect you and your clients' interests, I'll probably put something in there, there has to be some sort of cost sharing arrangement.

MS. JOHNSTON: And, Your Honor, just to speak to the efficiency component of it, I think that, you know, the vast majority of what happens in this litigation isn't in the courtroom and it's not on the phone or -- or in person with plaintiffs.

THE COURT: True.

MS. JOHNSTON: It's talking to each other and that is something I think all of the -- the different tiers of downstream defendants have done really well and I think that it has contributed to a lot of efficiencies in the way that we're handling discovery and -- and discussing those issues with plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay, so let's talk about a substantive

issue with regard to the non -- with regard to the -- the non-manufacturing defendants. Right off the bat, it's clear there -- there's -- I can't believe that plaintiffs would disagree with this, that there should be no duplication between the fact sheets and the requests for production. There can't be any dispute about that, right?

MR. SLATER: Right. Your Honor, we don't disagree with that. The question is this; the request for production provide overarching general discovery. When there's a particular plaintiff, what we need to be able to do is to be able to make sure that both sides are in the same page as to exactly -- for example, most of these -- the DFS's are primarily focused on product ID in a specific case, I mean, that's what we're talking about.

And the question Your Honor has to decide is the defendants' position has basically been you'll take the general documents that you'll get from the different defendants, you'll put the puzzle together, you'll figure it out, if you're right you're right, if you're wrong you're wrong.

Our position is so you want us to then take corporate rep depositions on specific cases of each level of the supply chain, have everybody put people under oath and spend all this money and time, as opposed to having one document where a party says on the defense side, yes, I'm

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going to confirm this plaintiff took this drug, this drug was contaminated, this drug was recalled, and this drug was sold -- I'm starting at the top of the chain -- was sold this this finished dose manufacturer, and then we figure out that it went to this distributor so we have it nailed down, because this is the issue we -- I raised with Your Honor and you said this is going to be done through discovery.

When I asked Your Honor why don't we all get together and figure all this out collectively and you said -- and -- and it was -- it was fine and said no, you're going to do this through discovery so that's what the DFS primarily is geared to, is the product ID.

What -- the push-back that I got yesterday, and that was not with Ms. Johnston but it was with a different level but I think the positions have been similar, I could be wrong, was that's your burden. And I said well, so you want us to try product ID as part of a trial?

Like do you think that's what the Court wants us to do, is not work this out on paper and figure out what the person took and -- and nail it down? And the answer was yeah, that's your burden, figure it out. And so that's really what is going on in general so there's not actual duplication because you take this overall mass of information and then you boil it down for this plaintiff -- who's the plaintiff in a case.

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So that we don't have product ID issues that are extant when we get to the point of preparing for trial or doing an expert report or walking into the Court to put the case on, that issue is a fundamental factual issue that should be dealt with on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis so it's not something that the Court then has to supervise or try the issue on product ID and have summary judgment motions on which group of pills the person took was contaminated or not, that -- our understanding from what Your Honor told me early on in litigation, that's -- that's what this process will be for and it's more efficient to do it that way.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question before we get into the nitty-gritty. I'm a realist and I know we don't live in a perfect world, but it would have been great if we could finalize this today. We're not going to finalize it today. Is -- are these issues ripe to decide or raise with the Court, or do you need another 30 days to meet and confer about these issues?

MR. SLATER: As a realist --

MS. JOHNSTON: Your Honor --

MR. SLATER: -- I think the best thing that can happen is -- and it might not even have to happen in this open courtroom on the record, if we could talk to Your Honor and understand where Your Honor sees it, for example, if you look -- if -- if you agree with our position I think it helps us to

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get to the finish line very quickly. If -- if the defense position is that hey, figure it out for yourself and it will be a crap shoot when you get to the end of the case whether you've got product ID accurate, then we're going to know, okay -- you know, I mean, I don't think that's practical or reasonable.

But if -- if for example, if the defense would understand, yes, you need to work with the plaintiffs on these DFS's and give product ID in a particular case, I think that we could probably get this done very quickly and -- and by the next telephone conference, be done.

MS. JOHNSTON: Your Honor, if I may briefly, I don't think that that's a -- it's really a fair characterization of -- of what defendants have been telling plaintiffs, and what we've also represented to the Court is that we -- we don't agree that we should provide certain information that gets plaintiffs to product identification.

The issue is -- and this is one that -- that you may recall we raised during the -- the telephone conference on December 18th when we -- we spoke about the original set of RPs that plaintiff served to all different levels of the supply chain --

THE COURT: But was this --

MS. JOHNSTON: -- we --

THE COURT: -- the phase one, phase two issue now?

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MS. JOHNSTON: No, Your Honor. This is actually a much more discreet issue, but it's a big-picture issue and that's the -- the fact that we've been telling plaintiffs since the beginning that the general business of pharmacies is not to trace at the -- the batch or a lot level at the point of sale.

And so we've had this discussion, we've now had this discussion with plaintiffs' counsel multiple times and how we -- and I'm going to paraphrase our -- our last conversation with you, Your Honor, which was essentially that, you know, the pharmacy is obviously their last touch-point before the drug goes out the door and we understand that, and we also know that there's certain information that provides a link in the chain that gets back up to the manufacturers, and we get that.

But following this discussion on December 18th where Your Honor advised plaintiffs to think hard about what they want, we also went back and thought hard about what we reasonably could do -- if we can't trace to the specific pill that goes to a customer or a consumer who comes into a pharmacy, what can we provide.

So over the holidays we spent a lot of time talking to our clients doing, you know, initial -- initial interviews regarding data systems and where things are centrally located and -- and so on, and we talked amongst ourselves and that's

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Colloguy the -- the coordination efforts that I mentioned, and we then had a very frank, specific conversation with plaintiffs that said we understand that you want this particular piece of product ID, we can't provide that for you --THE COURT: Is there --MS. JOHNSTON: -- but here's what we can give you. THE COURT: Okay, let me ask you a question. MS. JOHNSTON: Sure. THE COURT: Is there a specific question that would be representative of this issue that we can look at and have a concrete example of what we're talking about? MS. JOHNSTON: So in the draft request for production that the retailers and pharmacies sent on January 9th --THE COURT: So is that in this --MS. JOHNSTON: It is -- it is --THE COURT: What exhibit? MS. JOHNSTON: One second, Your Honor. (Pause in proceedings)

MS. JOHNSTON: Sorry, Your Honor. That is Exhibit

THE COURT: Let me get it. F.

(Pause in proceedings)

THE COURT: Okay. What number, for example?

MS. JOHNSTON: So these are again our -- I'll remind Your Honor that these are the requests that the retailers and

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pharmacies actually prepared in advance of the meet and confer for plaintiffs. We sent these to plaintiffs and said this will guide the conversation because this is what we have.

So I would say that the one and two, three and four which are basically sourcing, tracking and distribution, and those speak directly to exactly what Your Honor discussed during the December 18th call which is what is the information you can provide up and down the supply chain.

THE COURT: So this is what defendant is proposing it could answer.

MS. JOHNSTON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Which is the version that plaintiffs want you to answer? Is that G?

MS. JOHNSTON: I think so. Well, so I think -- so G is actually the set that they sent us last Wednesday night and I think H is the set that we got -- or I'm sorry, I is the set that we got Friday night, so it's slightly less than --

THE COURT: So should we look at I?

MS. JOHNSTON: I think so.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. JOHNSTON: But --

THE COURT: Let me look at I.

MS. JOHNSTON: And -- and I think just a point of clarification, the -- the part of this position paper that we put in front of the Court yesterday essentially said that

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Colloguy these are -- these are not issues that are ripe for ruling. We just got the discovery Friday, we're still looking it over. THE COURT: That's fine. I don't have any problem with that --MS. JOHNSTON: I understand. THE COURT: -- but I'm looking at I, okay? Number one, "Documents sufficient to identify when and from whom you purchase VCDs," no problem with that, right? MS. JOHNSTON: Well, I think that there are issues, and again, subject to the --THE COURT: But they're entitled to know --MS. JOHNSTON: -- brand new set of discovery. THE COURT: -- who you bought Valsartan from, right? MS. JOHNSTON: Well, I think that we've got some bigger relevance issues that we have to address which is how is Valsartan defined, what is the time period they're looking at, you know, we're --THE COURT: Fine. MS. JOHNSTON: -- we're going to have all those things to discuss.

THE COURT: You'll narrow it -- you'll work that out, but that's a basic request -- who did you purchase from and when.

MS. JOHNSTON: Well, and -- and I agree, Your Honor, that it is a fairly basic request. The issue is that we had

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this discussion multiple times where we'd said what is the time period, what is Valsartan, who are the manufacturers, are you

-- are you asking for every single pharmacy, most of whom are named in just a handful of cases to turn over all of their Valsartan --

THE COURT: You'll work that out in meet and confers, but isn't the big -- is the big issue, Ms. Johnston, is the big issue if they ask you to identify who supplied the Valsartan of Jane Doe, is that really the crux of the issue that you're concerned about, rather than you providing all the discovery and plaintiff has to do its homework, is that the --

MS. JOHNSTON: I'm not sure I'm following the question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Plaintiff Jane Doe --

MS. JOHNSTON: Right.

THE COURT: -- they give you a prescription. Who supplied this Valsartan and what's the batch and let number. Do you object to that question?

MS. JOHNSTON: I object on the grounds that we can't provide the batch and lot number for Jane Doe.

THE COURT: Okay, so is that -- is that the crux of the dispute?

MS. JOHNSTON: That is the crux of a dispute, and I guess the -- the issue is that this is a lot of information

for us to try to resolve on our end and it's something that we made very significant efforts to do and that's reflected in the discovery that we proposed to plaintiffs. It's not because we were trying to hide the ball on certain issues but during our -- our December 18th discovery conference the -- the argument for why the original request that -- that were ultimately stricken, the reason that plaintiffs offered that those were so over-broad was that they had a -- they had a knowledge gap as to what we do.

THE COURT: But now you have this Exhibit I. Is -do you think it would now be productive to meet and confer
about Exhibit I or -- because Mr. Slater is saying there are
some overarching issue that should be addressed before you get
down to discuss Exhibit I, what do you think?

MS. JOHNSTON: So I think that to the extent there is an issue that -- that Mr. Slater hasn't been -- doesn't believe has been addressed, we can certainly address it.

THE COURT: What is the -- what is the overarching issue that you think would be helpful to advance the ball?

MR. SLATER: I mean, I -- yeah, I mean I just -- what I was talking about was an overarching issue when you asked about duplicative -- duplicative requests, and I thought you were talking about as between the general requests for production versus the DFS's. That's where we started, so I was explaining that it's not truly duplicative.

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The issue that's being raised by counsel and -- and Ms. Whitely is ready to go through the specific requests item-by-item if necessary, was that from -- from our detailed call with counsel, we were walking through what information you get and how does it work for you to get a pill so we could understand the terminology, et cetera.

And basically what we got is they have a distribution center at the retailer-dispensary level and it comes in from the wholesalers and they can tell us this is what came in, okay, and then they can tell us this went out to various pharmacies, and I'm talking brick and mortar at this point putting aside online for a second.

I said okay, and then but what happens at the pharmacy level? We're not -- we don't want to -- it's not that they can't tell us, it's they said it would be too burdensome, they don't want to take the time or the money or whatever it is to define what got sold from each pharmacy.

So we said well all right, look, we have to prove we have an economic damages model here putting aside individual plaintiff product ID for a second. So we said well, would you agree that everything that went out of your distribution center was -- is -- that's the market? And by the way, you probably have to talk to the upstream wholesalers, finished dose and API manufacturers because we're talking about something that's going to impact everybody, and the answer was

no, we're not going to agree to that.

And we said well, how about a formula? No, we can't do that, you just -- we can -- we don't want to go to the expense, and this was just litigated in the opioid litigation as Your Honor might know -- and the Court -- and the Judge said no, you've going to -- you're going to give dispensing information. They don't want to give that information at the store level -- and I'm going store level again for the brick and mortar examples, so that was one of the issues.

And what you're ultimately looking at here is on the general request, which is what counsel is talking about now, that's not really my -- the concern I raised in terms of an individual product ID, that's the DFS level where we need to be able to get product ID for particular plaintiffs.

THE COURT: So should we be looking -- instead of the RFPs, should we be looking at the DFS?

MR. SLATER: We're going to have to do both. We just have to understand that there is not duplication because one is general and one is a case-specific product ID question for the most part. I mean, what you're ultimately going to look at -- remember, the way that we originally framed the DFS's was every defendant involved in that particular case was going to answer a section.

And it was going to start -- like the API manufacturers and finished dose need information from the

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retail level because they identified the pills differently as you go up or downstream, so the information has to be looked at from the retailer level -- okay, this is what we got from the wholesaler, they match -- they match it. Then the wholesaler has to give the information, they match it up the chain. They said no, we don't want to do it as one DFS, what they want is a series of black boxes and they don't want to interconnect them themselves.

They want to give us the series of black boxes and tell us to figure out how they fit together, which when we get to actually trying a case is not efficient. That's the DFS level. From what we're talking about now, we just need this information on the general level of what did you buy, where did you get it from, how is it identified so we can then work to put it together to figure out how much of the market from this manufacturer was contaminated, how much was went to this pharmacy so we can start to figure out for a damages model when we get to that point who's on the hook for what piece of the pie. Does that make sense?

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand, Ms. Johnston, what the issue is so if I need to address it, I can. At least as I understand from Mr. Slater, you'll work out the issues with regard to the general requests for production. The kinds of issues you raise are legitimate, they need to be hammered down.

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MS. JOHNSTON: I agree.

THE COURT: Is it the DFS that --

MS. JOHNSTON: No, Your Honor, I think that the -the primary issue that -- that I've seen in here today to talk
about is time. We just got this discovery.

THE COURT: Well, you got it.

MS. JOHNSTON: And I think that, you know, having --

THE COURT: We'll --

MS. JOHNSTON: -- the initial time to meet and confer --

THE COURT: We'll put it off for 30 days, okay?

Status report at the upcoming conference call, but we'll push this decision finalizing this non-manufacturing defendant DFS and fact -- DFS and RFV -- we'll put off finalizing it until the end of next month's meeting --

MS. JOHNSTON: Thank you, Your Honor, and -THE COURT: -- with a status report wherever you

are. MS. JOHNSTON: Sure.

THE COURT: There might be issues that will help advance the ball in -- in two or three weeks that we can deal with.

MS. JOHNSTON: And -- and just a -- a point of clarification, Your Honor, I think that the original plan was to have our meet and confers and to -- to see if we can hammer out a final set of requests, a final DFS, and then aim for

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briefing at the end of the month if there are still issues that we need the Court's --

THE COURT: Fine --

MS. JOHNSTON: -- attention on.

THE COURT: -- right, as well, but what I'm saying is there might be issues that are ready to be addressed for the conference call in two to three weeks that would help advance the ball for the finalization at the end of the month, you know, you can raise those as well.

MS. JOHNSTON: I agree, Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WHITELY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: So we've agreed --

MS. WHITELY: -- may I ask a question?

THE COURT: -- to kick the can down the road.

MS. WHITELY: I think it might be helpful -- so one of the -- the issues with timing is we did have a call with Ms. Johnston and several others and they provided us some information. One of that things that they told us is different retailers keep different information, so some it was -- it was understood from that call that some of the questions they will just say this doesn't apply to me whereas a different retailer will have information, so that question has to stay in.

One of the efforts that we intended to make was to

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try to reduce the retailers' RFPs further after talking to the wholesaler defendants to make sure if we know we can get it there, we take it off of the plaintiff retailers.

And so we got a little sidetracked on the class action issues with the wholesalers and I think that will be addressed later in the afternoon and that will provide clarity to us, but it might be helpful if we have a joint call with a representative of the retailers and the wholesales and just talk about where there's overlap and where there's gaps, and we might -- can move this forward a little more quickly.

THE COURT: You're going to be on that call, right?

MR. GEOPPINGER: I got to do it again? I'm sorry, I

-- I didn't hear what Ms. Whitely said exactly.

THE COURT: To have a -- a call between the three of you.

MR. GEOPPINGER: On the discovery?

THE COURT: On the discovery because there's overlap between your group and Ms. Johnston's group.

MS. JOHNSTON: And -- and, Your Honor, I think it's a good idea --

THE COURT: Can't disagree with that.

MS. JOHNSTON: -- and certainly something we can do, but I will say to Ms. Whitely's point that there are -- there are differences among the various defendants. They have different information and they keep it different places. So

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if there are specific questions, I do think that while this can be something that is coordinated amongst the three of us -- I know it's a sensitive issue, but I think there are going to probably need to be more than three attorneys on that call.

THE COURT: I'll leave it to you to address who should be on the call --

MS. JOHNSTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- but I think it makes sense for the plaintiff and the two non-manufacturing defendant groups to talk because there is overlap and there might be efficiencies that -- for both sides, both groups that may result from your meet and confers. Counsel?

MS. DAVIS: Your Honor, D'Lesi Davis for McKesson, a wholesaler. Just for the record on something that may or may not be just a housekeeping matter, I would note that the wholesalers have not been named in or served with the economic loss class action, but the RFPs as they currently exist define the defendant manufacturers to whom the RFPs are directed to be John Doe defendants whose names are not known.

So we raised this beginning on Christmas Eve with the plaintiffs and there's been no action in that regard, and so that's just an ongoing matter and to note for the record that we are not appearing in the economic loss case on that.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MS. DAVIS: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Is there anything to address with that, plaintiff?

MR. SLATER: Go ahead.

MR. STANOCH: Sure, Judge, David Stanoch. Just briefly on the point just raised about the substitution, at the time the economic loss complaint was filed, we didn't have enough records to show the distributors involvement. We've since gotten core discovery from manufacturers, we're prepared to do that.

They -- all distributors are named defendants and the other two -- the medical monitoring and personal injury master complaints, if there's a formality here we need to do to effectuate this for the economic loss complaint, we're happy to do a joint motion to substitute the three named distributor defendants for three John Doe defendants --

THE COURT: Do we need a motion? Can you do it by --

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: No --

MR. STANOCH: We're happy --

THE COURT: -- stipulation or --

MR. STANOCH: We're happy to --

THE COURT: -- consent order?

MR. STANOCH: -- do it by stipulation, Judge, whatever you would prefer.

THE COURT: That would be simpler if you could.

MR. STANOCH: Absolutely, Judge.

MS. DAVIS: We'll take them one at a time, Your

Honor --

THE COURT: In concept, any disagreement?

MS. DAVIS: We told them that we're not trying to

complicate things --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. DAVIS: -- we'll take it with that. I don't think there were factual allegations of wrongdoing against the wholesalers in the economic loss class action. They have not come to us with a proposal, so we'll obviously look at and -- and talk to our clients about what to do when we hear from them.

THE COURT: Well, if you need to amend the caption to add parties or amend the master complaint, let's do it by stipulation or consent order. I don't need a motion.

MR. STANOCH: Understood, Judge. We'll work it out with them.

THE COURT: The next issue on the agenda was fact sheets for the manufacturers. Is there any -- is there an issue with that?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, this issue came up weeks ago on the call we had. The -- the plaintiffs had served a fact sheet for the manufacturer defendants that is entirely duplicative --

THE COURT: Oh, that's right.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- of the information requested. This goes to the very same issue that we just discussed --

THE COURT: When --

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- you know --

THE COURT: No duplication, there's -- there can't be a dispute about that, so what's the issue?

MR. SLATER: No, there's no duplications. What I just framed out for Your Honor is that they interpret "duplication" -- when we asked for specific product ID in a specific plaintiff's case, they are saying that's duplication because somewhere in the giant haystack of documents, that information can be discerned.

And I said to counsel, so you don't want to do it through a DFS so you want us to take corporate rep deps where we -- we have a witness under oath and we have to go -- somehow we have to get product ID --

THE COURT: How can -- how can Mr. Goldberg's group trace down to the plaintiff level what drugs they received?

MR. SLATER: This is -- this is how it goes. We originally as Your Honor knows, proposed doing it on one sheet where one level would answer, then it would go to the next level, et cetera, so when serving different ones, so you just stage it.

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Once we get the retailer information and the wholesaler information, we then pass that information on to the finished dose and API manufacturers, and then they can complete their fact sheet specific to that plaintiff -- the specific drugs that plaintiff took meaning the specific pills. The alternative was -- is we figure it out ourselves. They don't have any statement -- they don't say anything about it. We would need depositions at that point --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Slater, I'm missing the --

MR. SLATER: -- and then it becomes a fact question.

THE COURT: -- I'm missing the boat about what the issue is. They -- unless you're going to tell me something that totally surprises me, how can a manufacturer say in India or China know what a specific plaintiff took? They can talk about what their customers received and then --

MR. SLATER: We provide --

THE COURT: -- they have to go from there.

MR. SLATER: Because we provide them the information that we get from the downstream defendants. When they give us product ID for that particular plaintiff, the NDC codes, the lots and batches as you go up the stream, we give that information to them from which they say oh, this came from this batch and this lot because they know what they sold.

So we provide them that information and then they

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have -- and then they say oh, this came from this lot and then they answer the questions -- you know, did you manufacture these drugs? Yes. Were they contaminated? Yes, specific to that plaintiff and we have a -- and the questions -- there's very few questions here.

THE COURT: Is there a specific -- I mean, is this in the exhibits that I received that we're talking -- what these --

MR. SLATER: I believe so.

THE COURT: -- what these objections are?

MR. SLATER: I think it is Exhibit -- let me see what our letter says -- Exhibit 9 I believe.

THE COURT: Exhibit 9 attached to plaintiffs?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yes.

MR. SLATER: Yes, Exhibit 9.

THE COURT: So let's -- let's identify what exactly we're -- is objected to.

MR. SLATER: And you'll see, Your Honor, the

Valsartan -- "the affected drugs," which is the definition

throughout, that's the identified drugs that the plaintiff

took. So when you see that language throughout this short

fact sheet, you'll see that that's what that means. It's not

talking in general, it's talking for that plaintiff.

(Pause in proceedings)

THE COURT: I'm having trouble identifying the fact

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sheet -- oh, is it API manufacturer defendants' fact sheet, is that what we're talking about?

MR. SLATER: That's the one we're talking about, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Goldberg, for example, I'm not worried about the definitions, nobody reads them anyway. Give me an example of an objection.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, I mean, the issue here is that if you look -- what -- what plaintiffs are proposing, you're right, Your Honor, defendants in China and India, they have no way of tracing their drug to a specific plaintiff. What -what plaintiffs are asking the defendants to do effectively is if Ms. Johnston on behalf of the retailers in a specific case can identify a lot or a batch or some information that we needed the manufacturers don't have that somehow connects the specific plaintiff to a drug, then the defendants would then go through the documents that we've already produced to the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 34 and we would then make the identification for plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. So look at page 2A. Is this an example of what you're talking about? Roman numeral II, capital A.

> MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. "Identify whether you manufactured the API found in any affected drug."

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MR. GOLDBERG: Right. And the affected drug is defined in the document as "the specific drug the plaintiff took."

THE COURT: Is that the only information you get though? Suppose they give you a lot and batch --

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, that's -- that's all part of that.

THE COURT: Can you -- with that information, can you identify whether you made that? Maybe that --

MR. GOLDBERG: It --

THE COURT: -- that's an easy one, but the question is it contaminated, would be a harder one, wouldn't it?

MR. GOLDBERG: Correct. I mean, and -- and I don't know -- what we don't know, what kind of information we would get. We -- we know the lots and batches we have, we know that -- and they do too and they're getting every -- all the information on all the lots and batches we made, they're getting all the testing results.

They -- we've already disclosed what lots and batches have been recalled, and so they will be able if -- if they can do it based on the information they're getting to go through the drugs and make the -- or go through the documents and information and make that determination.

THE COURT: Is that the crux of the issue, Mr. Slater?

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MR. SLATER: Yeah, I mean, we're going to give them the information that we get that identifies the drugs with the information they can then take and confirm, yes we sold it, yes it was contaminated, or no it was not contaminated or it was recalled or not -- you know, the information we asked for and they're going to commit to that.

It's very simple. I mean, otherwise what we have as I said is a series of black boxes, and they -- and, you know, they act as if they're not all in the case. They -- they're all sitting here. And so Mr. Goldberg is saying well, I don't know what Ms. Johnston's client knows and what the distributor knows, I'm saying I don't know any of that because -- and we don't talk to each other.

So what we're saying is when the information comes to us we should give it to them and it should be staged. We get the information from one group first, we hand it to them and then we get definitive product ID with the definitive information we need for a particular plaintiff so that case can be developed.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Judge, maybe I can concretize the problem in -- in this way. This is a product case, right? The product is Valsartan. If this were a car case, when it rolls off of the GM line, it's got a VIN number, right? It's unique to the car and the product in question, and now matter how many hands it goes down the distribution

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chain, you -- well you're going to know what car it is. We don't have that here.

What we've been informed of is that in some or all instances when it gets to the distributor and then downstream, the lot and batch from which it came from the API or the finished dose is unknown or not traced, it -- there's an NDC code.

So our clients, when they go to the pharmacy, they don't know what the lot and batch is, they know what an NDC code is, and so we need to put the puzzle together and the question is how most efficiently can we do it.

If we do it the way they want to do it which is here's the haystack, you're going to get a pile of API stuff, you're going to get a pile of this, you figure it out. What -- what Mr. Slater is saying, we're going to have to take depositions and we're going to have to put these documents in front of humans in every instance and put the puzzle together that way.

What we're proposing we think is a much more efficient way to figure out what the lot and batch was and by definition if we know -- if we know the lot and batch, we know which ones were subject to -- to recall. That's the only way we can put it together. The question is how most efficiently to do it.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question.

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UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yeah. THE COURT: Not the request for production, the fact sheets, am I correct -- is my understanding correct that they're directed to the individual plaintiffs? UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yes, as to the -yes, correct. THE COURT: Are we only talking about the individual plaintiffs in the three master complaints? UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Well, I think that's correct except --MR. SLATER: In personal injury plaintiffs. UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yes, that -- yes, that's correct. THE COURT: And --MR. SLATER: No, and the personal injury plaintiffs --THE COURT: Every personal --MR. SLATER: -- within the -- individual cases. THE COURT: -- injury plaintiff? MR. SLATER: Yes. Now, if you want to -- if you

stage the case a certain way, then that can be deferred. If the case is staged the way Your Honor talked about it earlier today, then that can be deferred for a period of time.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: That's true.

MR. SLATER: I mean, they can -- we can stage it.

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We need what we need to do what we have to do --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. SLATER: -- as we go.

THE COURT: Let me turn now to Mr. Goldberg. With regard to these questions, is -- is the issue we don't have the information, or is the answer it would be too burdensome for us to do it?

MR. GOLDBERG: Correct. We're producing all of the information.

THE COURT: But is this akin to an interrogatory? Suppose they served a Rule 33 interrogatory asking the same exact question, it's relevant. Would you have to answer it?

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, I -- I mean, I -- we would have an objection to it and we would --

THE COURT: On what grounds?

MR. GOLDBERG: On the grounds that it is burdensome to require us -- this was the whole point of Rule 34, you're asking -- we -- we've agreed now to produce all of the testing information, all of the recall information, all of the information related to the impurities, all of the regulatory documents.

That's what we're doing and we're giving it to them. We -- we can't -- we can't connect a specific lot and batch to a specific plaintiff. We don't have that information. get that information at the same time they get that

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information, what they're asking Your Honor to do is make us review the documents instead of them. That's it. That's all that's happening so that for 2,000 or however many personal injury plaintiffs, it's defendants who go through their documents instead of plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Suppose the Court says this. In concept, these particularized fact sheets only have to be answered for the named plaintiffs in the master complaints -- we'll pick a number -- five representative PI cases, so maybe that's a total of what, 20, 25? Would that be a problem?

MR. GOLDBERG: Obviously the -- the -- you're creating a different set of circumstances in terms of burden. It also wouldn't be any more burdensome for them and it's their case. It is their burden to satisfy. Product identification is an element of their claim.

THE COURT: So I guess your answer, Mr. Slater, that if the burden is equal, is your answer that it's just more efficient to do it your way than their way?

MR. SLATER: Well, it's not equal because they ultimately are going to have to commit on paper to specifically define what happened in that specific plaintiff's case. We're not as equipped to do it, and there's a burden of uncertainty that will burden the litigation that this -- that that's a burden that is not going to be good for the Court, it's not going to be good for the plaintiffs or the

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defendants.

I mean, literally if we take the scenario Your Honor floated earlier and we have a class -- we have an economic loss complaint with three plaintiffs go forward, their proposal is that at trial, they want to have us put witnesses on to establish product ID, they want to cross the witnesses, so we'd have to put their witnesses on --

MR. GOLDBERG: Judge --

MR. SLATER: -- which means we'd have to depose them in advance and put together the product ID. And by the way, in every product liability case, Mr. Honik said -- especially mass torts like this, product ID is a systemized process that is never this difficult. It's automatic, it's something that the defendants have to participate in actively and confirm product ID in a case like this because it's not just product ID and it's not just recall.

There's going to be a gray area of pills which are potentially contaminated, and as I said very early on and I have said many times, ultimately we're going to have to understand before we walk into Court to try this case whether or not a particular plaintiff's pills or what portion of what they took were clearly contaminated and recalled, potentially contaminated because they may have been used before the recall went into effect for example, or definitely not contaminated because that lot and batch has been tested by the defense and

by the plaintiffs and the FDA, and confirmed not to be contaminated.

THE COURT: I think I've got it.

MR. SLATER: Thank you.

THE COURT: But let me -- let me ask you this question because I'm going to rule separately on this issue.

Once the Court rules on the issue, let's -- let's hypothetically -- I'm not ruling now, but if the Court requires defendant to answer it, do you still have to meet and confer about the specific language in the fact sheets, or is it all or nothing, or do we have to get this -- what I call a "macro" issue decided first and then you'll role up your sleeves and work on the specific language? Mr. Goldberg, I guess I should direct this to you.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, Your Honor, we -- we have exchanged drafts and we would -- the last draft we would -- if -- if the Court is going to require the defendants to do something like --

THE COURT: You still need to work on it?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, fair enough. Ms. Johnston, I didn't mean to cut you off.

MS. JOHNSTON: Yeah, Your Honor, I just wanted to -to clarify again and I think this is a bigger issue because,
you know, it's one that we have tried to express for months

now, that this is not something that -- that, you know, batch and lot and tracing to a particular consumer is very highly unlikely and I feel like that is something that we've requested that plaintiffs take in because I think that -- that the way that pharmacies operate and the way that this information is tracked is it falls under a very specific statutory framework.

Pharmacies follow it in their course of business and to now say that our burden is greater because the answer is unsatisfying to them I feel like is what's stalling out a lot of these conversations.

THE COURT: Okay, got it. Next issue, the show cause process short form complaint and the fact sheets, that's different than the adequacy of the answers. Are there sill issues, defendants, I hope not, where plaintiffs have not filed their short form complaints or have not filed the fact sheets that are due?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor, there are.

THE COURT: Oh, darn it.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: So I guess back in January we had submitted a letter that had an exhibit that had I think it was about 90 or so short form complaints that were either improperly filed or not filed at all. I think that that number is down to about 13, a combination of either not

filed properly or not filed at all, but here are --

THE COURT: So 13 short form complaints are at issue?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Approximately.

THE COURT: Are they identified in the defendants' letter?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: They are identified in I believe it's Exhibit P to defendants' letter.

THE COURT: Exhibit P? And is that -- plaintiffs, is that just -- what, it slipped through the cracks? Or why can't we get these 13 to --

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Your Honor, we promptly communicated with all of the counsel who filed all these many complaints the first time. It's not as simple for some of these administratively to talk with defendants about what the issue was. They said they were improperly filed, but the issues were very varied for each firm.

I've been personally trying to walk through with all the firms, and as Mr. Rubenstein noted, cut it down. I'd ask Your Honor for another -- a little more time, another week or two with those -- those firms, they only have one or two cases each.

THE COURT: I'll enter an order, counsel --

MR. NIGH: Your Honor --

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Okay.

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THE COURT: -- making sure they get it done.

MR. NIGH: -- we -- we had a process identified that I think would have cut down -- it's the same process as the PFS and they would list -- you would list each month --

THE COURT: No, no, this is different --

MR. NIGH: -- the improvidently filed cases. We have that even for cases -- these -- these issues came up early on when people didn't file a short form complaint or if somebody filed and then had improper jurisdiction, you know, issues like that, that for under the listing of improvidently filed cases and they follow the same --

THE COURT: Can I ask you a question, Mr. Nigh? The -- the order that was entered and the show cause process that we've implemented, I know that pertains to the fact sheets --

THE COURT: -- unquestionably, did that also file to these short -- I -- my understanding, I could be wrong, that that didn't also apply to the short form complaint issue.

MR. NIGH: Yeah.

MR. NIGH: I believe it did and I believe it would be under the listing of improvidently filed cases, so we would have agendas each month that would list them, and if they were listed twice under "improvidently filed cases" and there was no explanation for it in court, then they would get the show cause order.

THE COURT: Okay, so there has to be two listings.

MR. NIGH: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, that's great. That's -- that would be my inclination. I'd prefer not to issue the order to show cause the first time this is raised, so these 13 people, can you just tell them to get it right?

MR. NIGH: Absolutely, Your Honor, and I'll confer with defendants further to understand the exact issue they think they have because in some of these instances, these lawyers tell me it looks good on their end, but we'll figure it out.

THE COURT: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: And then, Your Honor, I would just ask that we have a listing in the agenda each month that says "improvidently filed cases" and they're listed by name and counsel, because that's the other way that they get notice. So somehow -- somehow our liaison counsel doesn't have direct contact with them, which can happen from time to time, then it's listed in the agenda, so that's the other way it noticed.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, you know, for the short form complaints, but then we had the issue of the fact sheets where the January 15th deadline came and went and we didn't --

THE COURT: How many of those are there?

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twice to issue the order to show cause. UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: So the -- the show

cause order actually doesn't address plaintiffs who just simply failed to submit a fact sheet, it -- it addresses, you know, not substantially complete or somehow deficient fact sheets, it doesn't address --

THE COURT: I would --

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UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- failure to actually submit one.

THE COURT: I would assume that if they don't file it at all, that would be subsumed within that definition.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, I mean, I think it's just a little more egregious than -- you know, there's a difference between, you know, submitting one that may have some deficiencies on it but than just simply just ignoring the process altogether.

THE COURT: But then we don't have an order to show cause procedure for those.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, that's -- we -- we ask that maybe we implement a different show cause --

THE COURT: No, we're not going to do -- we're going to do the same thing we did in <a href="Benicar">Benicar</a>. The Court's direction is if they don't answer, it's subsumed within the deficient fact sheet --

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: And, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- let's do it that way and when you list, you could list parties who have not filed at all and parties whose answers are inadequate.

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Okay.

THE COURT: Let's do it that way.

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Now and I would also ask that those are in the file agenda as well --

THE COURT: Yeah, absolutely.

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: -- case names --

THE COURT: Yeah. And look at one of the ones that was in <a href="Benicar">Benicar</a>. It just worked so smoothly. The listed out, get to the afternoon session with Judge Kugler, listed twice, order to show cause, it just works very smoothly, okay?

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Defendants' leadership structure, we talked about that; plaintiffs' leadership structure, we talked about that. Confidentiality designations, you're meeting and conferring on that?

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, we will. Just so you understand why we did what we did --

THE COURT: I understand -- representative, I think that's a great idea. This is a very important issue, this confidentiality designation. If a document deserves to be designated, it's going to be designated, but over-designation is not appropriate, especially in a case where there's such a public health concern so hopefully you could work it out.

Am I wrong that if these particular documents are subject to a FOIA, I don't understand how you can put a confidentiality stamp on it -- am I -- am I wrong about that?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, they -they could be subject to a FOIA request, but as we've seen,
the FDA could then go ahead and redact certain information, so

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they're not just wholesale --

THE COURT: Do they unilaterally redact it, or does the CFR require that the defendant designate when it gives a document to the FDA what is a trade secret?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: I -- I'm not -- I think that the --

THE COURT: I would be surprised if the FDA unilaterally decides what to redact and what not to redact unless the defendant brings something to its attention. Am I wrong about that?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: My -- my understanding, that it was unilaterally redacted by the FDA.

MR. SLATER: The FDA actually will redact things sometimes that you could never subject to a -- a confidentiality order in Court, and it's random so yes, if something is subject to FOIA, it should be produced in its entirety we believe.

But more important, when Your Honor told us on the call -- you know what, you're -- you can't serve these letters with this letter that -- you know, the documents that were identified, you said send them to me, I want to look at them right away, so we sent them.

And the -- the point -- I don't think a meet and confer -- I mean, we're happy to talk, but it kicks the can down the road for this reason. So we gave you -- Your Honor

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exemplars, so the point is if they say oh fine, we'll withdraw the -- the confidentiality designations on these ten documents, that doesn't help that there's thousands of documents that are being over-designated. THE COURT: No, these are representative of the different categories, and I would assume how the Court rules on these is going to apply to those categories --MR. SLATER: We would assume that too, so we're not sure where -- I mean, they're so -- we're happy to talk to counsel but we're -- we're -- you know, we're very confident --THE COURT: Let's brief it. MR. SLATER: -- that they need to be challenged. THE COURT: Who goes first? I'm not sure who goes first. MR. SLATER: I don't honestly think based on Your Honor's experience that we really even need to brief them. THE COURT: No, I do think we need to brief this issue. MR. SLATER: Okay. THE COURT: I do think we need to brief this issue. Who goes first? UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I think

we can go first since the plaintiffs have identified these as

the documents that they think --

THE COURT: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- are responsive because I think you have to -- the Court's going to have to look at this on a case-by-case basis. I can speak to Mylan, for instance. There's one document for Mylan that the plaintiffs identified as representative, and it was part of the ANDA for which case law permits the confidentiality designation.

Not to mention, if Your Honor recalls, we had to go through the process and produce it twice in ECD format, the second time at plaintiffs' request, and Your Honor said on the record that we're going to designate the whole thing as confidential so you don't have to worry about going through and designating it a second time when you produce it.

So the representative document that's been produced as a -- as a representation of over-designation by the -- by the plaintiffs is a document that's part of the ANDA that the case law supports as being confidential and which this Court has already said is entitled to blanket confidentiality, so I'm happy to -- to brief this.

THE COURT: Hm-hmm.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think we can go first and -- and I think what the Court's going to find if you -- you look carefully at each of these documents, we're all mindful of the Court's admonition that we're not going to

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over-designate documents. We took time not to do that, that these designations I believe were largely --

THE COURT: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- proper and we can show --

THE COURT: February 10th, plaintiffs -- defendants, brief this issue using the categories the plaintiff identified as representative. Plaintiffs, respond by February 17th, and I'll put that in the order. I do think it's an important enough issue that it does have to be briefed.

Product preservation issues, another important issue. Is there any disagreement that plaintiffs need some relevant background information before they decide whether to tee up this issue in a motion? Defendants?

What the motion would be. We have at least -- I do know that all of the defendants have looked at this issue and have provided information to plaintiffs on the issue of recall, on the issue of product preservation, and there's some -- each defendant is at a different stage of dialogue.

THE COURT: Well, plaintiffs are going to ask that certain product be preserved. We're not going to preserve every pill that --

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yup.

THE COURT: -- on first blush -- I'm not ruling but

it just seems illogical so there has to be a representative product preservation. Plaintiffs are going to ask if they can't agree with defendants on that, for a court order to that effect. If so, we'll need a motion.

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: And that -- I think that's what we're working out and I think the parties are communicating on those issues.

THE COURT: Okay. So we'll revisit this in a couple of weeks at the phone call to see if you -- if you reach agreement, great. But if not, I'm going to ask plaintiffs to file a motion. Counsel?

MS. HILTON: Layne Hilton for plaintiffs, Your
Honor. I mean, there is one sort of pressing issue. I think
we still don't have confirmation that product -- all product
that is currently in existence right now is being preserved
until a time at which we can brief it and make determinations
as to sampling. I think we have assurances from Mylan, from
Teva and from Aurobindo that that product is being preserved.
I think Hetero is preserving product as of -- as of now.

We still don't have assurances that product is currently being preserved in this interim time period until we can make our sampling decisions from the -- we'll call them the ZHP defendants including defendant Solco and defendant Torrent.

THE COURT: So if we lived in a perfect world, would

issue, the defendants are ordered not to destroy any recalled

you want a court order saying until the Court addresses this

product?

MS. HILTON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there any objection to that order?

MR. SLATER: And, Your Honor, not -- not limited to recall, but at this point potentially contaminated, both in the United States and outside the United States.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, without having a great deal of thought to it, I think you -- what the -- the blanket order that the Court's now contemplating or suggesting it might enter, I think you run into issues with the primary jurisdiction of the FDA. I mean, these recalls were all managed in conjunction with the FDA that decides how -- how recalled product is to be handled, how it's to be stored, how it -- in some instances, it's to be destroyed.

And I would worry at the outset when we've got an MDL involving 50 different parties and all these parties having different obligations to the FDA, about entering an order and worrying about whether that order complies with the regulatory requirements that have been imposed on various defendants and so forth, I think for the most part it's a non-issue.

For instance, as Ms. Hilton indicated, my client's particular recall campaign involves returned product being

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stored at a third-party vender site's (inaudible) cycle and we've indicated that all that recalled product is being held per the direction of the FDA and nothing's being destroyed. But that's -- that's our recall campaign that was negotiated and implemented and in coordination with the FDA.

That's not everyone's and so I think a blanket order under the circumstances would be inappropriate and as I said, creates some issues with primary jurisdiction with respect to the regulatory body that at least would concern me at the outset.

MR. SLATER: Your Honor, I want to make very clear, as far as we're concerned, there already is a preservation order in place, this Court's case management order from the very beginning of litigation. So whatever we're doing is now reiterating that every one of these parties has been under an obligation under the -- the order of this Court to preserve all evidence from the moment that order was issued, and frankly, from the time that they thought litigation was potential, they had litigation hold obligations.

So I don't -- I didn't want what I said before to be misconstrued, as far as we're concerned, as soon they're on litigation hold obligation, at the very least they had to preserve everything and it may go back further.

We'll have to go into that issue if it becomes an issue in this litigation because we have significant concerns

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that significant amounts of product have been destroyed, particularly not in the United States but -- or and or repackaged and sold even though it was contaminated.

I mean, there's a lot we're going to need to learn about what they did with this so I just wanted to be clear for the record, they're already under an obligation legally outside of this litigation and per the case management order.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL:

THE COURT: Let's address this --

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, if the plaintiffs think we're already under an obligation, then we don't need another order.

THE COURT: Let's address this issue this afternoon in further detail, okay? The request is plaintiffs want the Court to enter another order -- let's address this this afternoon.

MS. JOHNSTON: And, Your Honor, just briefly for our discussion while we're on a break, this is an issue that we've -- we had stepped out of on the downstream and because it's been focused on the manufacturers, but based on the order that's being proposed, it does seem like it would happen downstream of the patient, so I'd like some clarity on that because obviously we have some -- we've got some concerns with -- with the way that that would affect --

THE COURT: We'll address --

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MS. JOHNSTON: -- the pharmacy business.

THE COURT: We'll address it this afternoon. Next issue on the agenda is core discovery and I guess that encompasses the FDA correspondence --

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- issue?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: -- and it corresponded -- it refers to the -- the recall documents for Part A. Our understanding is that we received new productions of documents last week, early this week, received other production of documents on that I -- I suppose to be correspondence last night.

I haven't had the opportunity to look at it, but I think the second issue with respect to the ongoing obligation to produce the correspondence pertains to again as we've discussed in the telephonic conference two weeks ago, the -- the usage of third parties --

THE COURT: Well, didn't the Court make that clear in the last order?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: We -- we -- you did, Your Honor. I think but part of our issue is that because we don't understand the universe of may be corresponding with the FDA, it is sort of difficult for plaintiffs to police whether or not the correspondence is actually being produced. That is why we asked to get

affirmative representations from defendants on the identity of all designated US agents who have been given authority to correspond with the FDA on behalf of the manufacturers.

THE COURT: If the defendants are doing what the court order says and you're getting copies of these papers, can't you identify from those copies who the agents are?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: In some instances we can, but then we haven't received any subsequent correspondence so we have reason to believe that we haven't received the correspondence that they've written.

Again, as -- as we identified in our letter, there's a particular issue with a -- a good manufacturing practices consultant who's a former FDA inspector who appears to be communicating on his own from his own Comcast email address without copying in copying in his ZHP employees and -- and, you know, we received one email, we didn't receive any metadata associated with that email.

We've made a request for that metadata and we still haven't received it yet and -- and we have no assurances that there are other emails in this consultant's Comcast email address that are communications with the FDA on -- on behalf of ZHP.

And so I think, you know, part of -- to assist us in -- in sort of making sure that we're getting all the correspondence we need, that's, you know, partly why we asked

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for the affirmative representation, so then, you know, if we're not getting anything or -- or it could even be a representation if they had this consultant -- if they haven't made communication, that's fine, but we -- we just really don't understand the universe right now of -- of these third parties.

THE COURT: Is there an objection, defendants, to providing the information plaintiffs request?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don't -- there -at least from ZHP's standpoint here's no objection to identifying consultants that may be communicating with the FDA on ZHP's behalf or on behalf of those defendants. I don't know, I haven't polled the other defendants on this issue, but at least Ms. Hilton's comment were focused on ZHP.

THE COURT: Okay. I can't see why would there be an objection. Their names are going to be in the communications that are produced anyway so I'll -- I'll include that in an order. Now, defendants, you want 14 days rather than seven days, I'm not going to quibble about an extra seven days, except that's what the rule provides.

We've been involved in umpteen patent cases involving billions of dollars and no one has ever objected to the seven or 14 days. I don't know what is so unique about this case that there has to be more time, but if you want more time and it will assure compliance with the Court's order,

that's fine.

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But I have asked plaintiffs to stay on top of this issue and keep the Court updated. This is a very very important issue that the plaintiffs get this relevant communications on a timely basis so, plaintiff, continue to advise the Court if there are issues with this production.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: We will, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Goldberg?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, we've --

THE COURT: You got the 14 days.

MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, I mean, I think the 14 days, at least with respect to these FDA communications and --

THE COURT: You got it.

MR. GOLDBERG: -- and, you know, we're doing our best to try to --

THE COURT: You got it.

MR. GOLDBERG: -- satisfy that.

THE COURT: I think the last issue is the ESI Is there any material information to talk about?

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Counsel for Mylan requested an extension for a portion of this documents that are due January 31st which we've agreed to, so we just wanted to update the Court on that. And then as to the remainder of the search term documents, we've corresponded with both

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counsel for ZHP and Mylan as to the status of their custodial collection and production of search terms, but we -- it's concerning because we have not heard from any of the other defendants as to the status of their search and process in narrowing or doing anything with the search terms, so we just -- we just haven't heard from them.

> THE COURT: Are these the test searches? UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Right.

THE COURT: I don't -- can you refresh my recollection? What, did we put time deadlines in the order? UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: We did not, and but we -- you know, we thought we were sort of working together on these and so we thought it might be useful to have some time to --

THE COURT: What do you -- what do you propose? UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: I -- we think that by the end of next month at the next status conference, we should be able to -- we -- I mean they should be able to have a finalized -- you know, if there -- if there are any disputes with the search terms that they want to raise, they should have raised them by then and if they haven't, then --

> THE COURT: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: -- we think it should be --

THE COURT: Is there any objection to that, raise

any dispute by the end of --

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Well, in time to have them resolved by the -- the status conference, the next status conference.

THE COURT: Raise with the Court and the parties will have to meet and confer before then.

UNIDENTIFIED PLAINTIFF COUNSEL: Right.

THE COURT: Fine. Is that -- is that -- let's make sure our calendars are -- is that meeting scheduled for February -- what date is on your calendar, is it February 26th?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think it's February 26, Your Honor,

THE COURT: February 26. And how about our conference call? Is that February 12?

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, great. Okay, are there any other issues to address this morning? We have a pretty hardy agenda for this afternoon. At least when I met with Judge Kugler this morning, he wanted to start out by meeting with leadership counsel in the jury room. We may or may not go on the record, I'm not sure.

UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, just one logistical point on that with that precise issue, I just wanted to request that I be permitted to attend that

conference in case Judge Kugler wanted to discuss the direct 1 filing order in that -- in the context of that conversation. 2 3 THE COURT: Granted. UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: 4 Thank you. 5 MR. ST. ONGE: And, Your Honor, same request from Legacy. 6 7 THE COURT: Granted. My friend back there? 8 MR. GEOPPINGER: I'm all right, Your Honor, thank 9 you. 10 THE COURT: You'll be there, right? 11 MS. DAVIS: Your Honor, D'Lesi Davis for McKesson 12 will attend. 13 For your three -- three groups? THE COURT: 14 MS. DAVIS: With your permission. 15 THE COURT: Are you going to be representative of the three? 16 MS. DAVIS: Well, I think on the -- on the issues, 17 18 perhaps. 19 THE COURT: No, we don't want all three there, just 20 one of the three. MS. DAVIS: This relates to some of the class 21 22 certification questions that you had addressed early in the proof hearing. 23 24 THE COURT: Okay. Can you -- for liaison purposes

for just today, can you represent you three?

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PageID: 6110 Colloguy MS. DAVIS: Will I have five minutes to talk to them 1 2 right before I show up --3 THE COURT: Talk to who? MS. DAVIS: -- to confirm -- to talk to Cardinal and 4 5 ABC --THE COURT: Of course. 6 7 MS. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Of course. 9 MS. DAVIS: I'll know when I get there --10 UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: And, Your Honor, 11 just --12 THE COURT: Ms. Johnston, you'll be there. 13 MS. JOHNSTON: Wouldn't miss it. UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, just one 14 -- one small point for clarification. You know, the objecting 15 defendants do hope for and anticipate whatever ruling might be 16 17 issued today be issued on the record. So we're prepared to discuss it off the record, but we obviously would prefer to --18 19 THE COURT: Make sure you make that point to Judge 20 Kugler, okay? UNIDENTIFIED DEFENSE COUNSEL: -- have that be down 21 the road. Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay, so enjoy your lunch. We'll see 23 24 you in the jury room at 2:00. We're adjourned.

COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.

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| 1    | (Proceedings concluded, 12:27 p.m.)   |
| 2    | * * *   |
| 3    | CERTIFICATION   |
| 4    |   |
| 5    | We, Josette Jones and Diane Gallagher, court  |
| 6    | approved transcribers, certify that the foregoing is a correct                              |
| 7    | transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the                              |
| 8    | proceedings in the above-entitled matter.   |
| 9    |   |
| 10   |   |
| 11   | JOSETTE JONES   |
| 12   |   |
| 13   |   |
| 14   | DIANE GALLAGHER DATE  |
| 15   | DIANA DOMAN TRANSCRIBING, LLC   |
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